Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein, LLP - Intellectual Property Law http://www.arelaw.com/ Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein is a well-established mid-sized legal firm engaged exclusively in the practice of intellectual property law, including patents, trademarks, copyrights, unfair competition and related matters. Since our inception in 1953, we have earned an impressive record of successes for our clients, from individuals to multinational corporations, both domestic and worldwide. These successes are borne of the vigorous application of legal expertise, innovation and objective analysis. en Sat, 19 Jan 2019 14:33:34 +0000 Floodlight Design CMS Practical Law<br>IP Rights Clauses in Robotic Process Automation (RPA) Agreements<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw011719/ <a href="/images/file/IP%20Rights%20Clauses%20in%20Robotic%20Process%20Automation%20(RPA)%20Agreements%20(1_17_19).pdf" target="_blank">IP Rights Clauses in Robotic Process Automation (RPA) Agreements</a> Thu, 17 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw011719/ Time For High Court To Clarify Standing For IPR Appeals http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/011619article/ In JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd.,[1] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit added to a series of decisions, where the Federal Circuit engrafted a patent-inflicted-injury-in-fact requirement for a dissatisfied petitioner in an inter partes review proceeding to appeal an adverse final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. JTEKT has filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to have the U.S. Supreme<br />Court review the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s standing jurisprudence. In RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC,[2] the Supreme Court invited the solicitor general to provide its views on this very important issue. This article explains why the Supreme Court should confirm a &ldquo;dissatisfied&rdquo; petitioner&rsquo;s right to challenge on appeal an adverse final written decision of the PTAB in an IPR proceeding, as set forth by Congress in 35 U.S.C. &sect; 319.<br /><br /><strong>The Federal Circuit Applies Too Narrow an Injury-in-Fact Test </strong><br /><br />JTEKT is the latest in &ldquo;a series of decisions, [where the Federal Circuit] ha[s] held the statue [35 U.S.C. &sect;141(c)] cannot be read to dispense with the Article III injury-in-fact requirement for appeal to [that] court.&rdquo;[3] <br /><br />As examples of these decisions, JTEKT cited Phigenix Inc. v. Immunogen Inc.,[4] and Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.[5] Phigenix required the petitioner/appellant to be &ldquo;at risk &lsquo;of infringing the [patent at issue] ... or [other] action that would implicate the patent.&rdquo;[6] Consumer Watchdog involved an inter partes re-examination by a nonprofit organization which did not conduct research and was not a competitor of the patent owner.[7] <br /><br /><a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/1118999/time-for-high-court-to-clarify-standing-for-ipr-appeals" target="_blank">Full article available here</a>. (subscription required)<br type="_moz"><br /><br /><br type="_moz" /></br> Wed, 16 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/011619article/ IPWatchdog<br>In Support of the Right of Dissatisfied Parties to Appeal Adverse IPR Decisions<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01152019article/ On January 11th, Askeladden LLC (Askeladden) <a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/-/media/pqi/files/amicus-briefs/jtekt-v-gkn--askeladden-amicus-brief-supreme-court.pdf?la=en" target="_blank">filed an amicus brief</a> in support of the Supreme Court accepting certiorari from JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., No. 2017-1828 (Fed. Cir. 2018). This case raises the important question of whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit can refuse to hear an appeal by a non-defendant petitioner from an adverse final written decision in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding on the basis of a lack of a patent-inflicted injury-in-fact, even though Congress has statutorily created the right for &ldquo;dissatisfied&rdquo; parties to appeal to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 319.<br /><br />In the proceedings below, JTEKT filed a petition requesting IPR pursuant to the relevant statutory scheme devised by Congress in the America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 311-319. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) later issued a final written decision holding the challenged claims of the patent not unpatentable.<br /><br />JTEKT then filed to appeal the PTAB&rsquo;s decision to the Federal Circuit, to which GKN Ltd. (GKN) moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of Article III standing. JTEKT had the burden to demonstrate some injury resulting from the PTAB&rsquo;s decision. JTEKT submitted two declarations in support of its standing. Although JTEKT couldn&rsquo;t definitively say whether it would infringe the patent, JTEKT argued that the general features were similar and the &ldquo;patent posed a risk to future development.&rdquo; JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Auto. Ltd., 898 F.3d 1217, 1221 (Fed. Cir. 2018).<br /><br /><a href="https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/01/15/right-dissatisfied-parties-appeal-adverse-ipr-decisions/id=105140/" target="_blank">Full Article</a> Tue, 15 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01152019article/ AMICUS BRIEF OF ASKELADDEN L.L.C. AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus01112019/ Click to dowload PDF:&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="/images/AMICUS_BRIEF_OF_ASKELADDEN_L_L_C_ AS_AMICUS_CURIAE_IN_SUPPORT_OF_PETITIONER.pdf">AMICUS BRIEF OF ASKELADDEN LLC AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER</a> Fri, 11 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus01112019/ In The Press:<br>Askeladden Continues to Advocate for the Ability of Non-Defendant IPR Petitioners to Appeal Adverse PTAB Decisions<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01112019inthepress/ <div>New York, NY &mdash; Askeladden filed an amicus brief today with the United States Supreme Court in JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd. advocating for the Court to review and correct the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s standing jurisprudence with respect to the ability of non-defendant inter partes review (IPR) petitioners to appeal adverse decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).&nbsp; &nbsp;</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>In its brief, Askeladden argues that the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decisions conflict with Supreme Court jurisprudence:</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>&ldquo;The Federal Circuit failed to consider the Congressionally defined injury-in-fact in 35 U.S.C. &sect;319, namely, a party being &lsquo;dissatisfied&rsquo; with the PTAB&rsquo;s final written decision.&nbsp; The Federal Circuit also failed to address whether this definition promulgated by Congress exceeds the constitutional limits of Article III standing. . . .These omissions are significant.&nbsp; Spokeo explains that Congress can define an intangible injury that is sufficient to give Article III standing to a party in a proceeding to participate in a challenge to an adverse decision, even where standing would not exist but for Congress&rsquo; definition.&rdquo;</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>In September, Askeladden submitted an amicus brief in support of JTEKT&rsquo;s petition for en banc review at the Federal Circuit.&nbsp; In July, Askeladden submitted an amicus brief in support of RPX Corporation&rsquo;s petition for certiorari in RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC, in which the standing of non-defendant IPR petitioners to appeal adverse PTAB decisions is at issue.</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>Askeladden filed the briefs as part of its Patent Quality Initiative, which seeks to improve patent quality and promote innovation by challenging poor quality patents, addressing questionable patent practices, and regularly filing amicus briefs in cases concerning important issues of patent law.</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div>Askeladden is represented by Amster Rothstein and Ebenstein LLP.</div><div>&nbsp;</div><a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/news/press-releases/news-items/jtekt-amicus-brief---supreme-court" target="_blank">Article Available Here</a>. Fri, 11 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/01112019inthepress/ Is the Government a ‘Person’? NYIPLA tells SCOTUS it depends http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12202018/ By <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a> &amp; <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/dgoldberg/" target="_blank">David Goldberg</a>&nbsp;&amp; <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/jhahm/" target="_blank">Jung Hahm</a> &amp; Peter Thurlow &amp; Robert Isackson &amp; Robert J. Rando<br /><br />On Monday, December 17, 2018, the New York Intellectual Property Association (&ldquo;NYIPLA&rdquo;) filed an <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594 ac NY Intellectual Property Law Association.pdf" target="_blank">amicus brief</a> in support of neither party in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, No. 17-1594 (U.S.).<br /><br />In the proceedings below, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) issued a final written decision in a Covered Business Method patent review (&ldquo;CBM&rdquo;) proceeding instituted based on a petition by the U.S. Postal Service (&ldquo;USPS&rdquo;), invalidating certain claims of a patent owned (and asserted in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) by Return Mail, Inc. USPS is a &ldquo;government entity&rdquo; as recognized in United States Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 748 (2004). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) affirmed the PTAB&rsquo;s holding that USPS has standing to file a petition to institute a CBM proceeding.<br /><br />The U.S. Supreme Court granted Return Mail&rsquo;s petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute review proceedings under the AIA.<br />While the NYIPLA took no position as to the ultimate merits of Petitioner Return Mail&rsquo;s underlying position, i.e., whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute a CBM proceeding under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B), the NYIPLA argued that it strongly believes that the Court should carefully consider the potential implications of interpreting &ldquo;person&rdquo; in Title 35 of the U.S. Code (&ldquo;Patent Act&rdquo;) and the AIA as including or excluding the government generally, and then issue only a narrow holding on the scope of &ldquo;person&rdquo; under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B) and, if at all, under 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 311(a) and 321(a).<br /><br />Full article available at:&nbsp;<br /><br /><a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/20/government-person-nyipla-scotus-depends/id=104408/" target="_blank">www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/12/20/government-person-nyipla-scotus-depends/id=104408/</a><br type="_moz" /> Thu, 20 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12202018/ LAW360 REPORTS ON AMICUS BRIEF FILED IN RETURN MAIL V. US POSTAL SERVICE WITH U.S. SUPREME COURT http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12182018/ IP Groups, Think Tank Tell Justics Gov't Isn't A 'Person'<br />Law360 (December 18, 2018)<br /><br />By Matthew Bultman<br /><br /><a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/1112608/ip-groups-think-tank-tell-justices-gov-t-isn-t-a-person" target="_blank">https://www.law360.com/articles/1112608/ip-groups-think-tank-tell-justices-gov-t-isn-t-a-person</a><br />(available by subscription only)<br /><br />Law 360 report:<br /><br />The New York Intellectual Property Law Association has a somewhat different view.<br /><br />While the NYIPLA said it might be that the government cannot petition for CBM review, the group said the government may still be a &ldquo;person&rdquo; able to file IPRs and PGRs. It said the AIA&rsquo;s provision dealing with CBMs was &ldquo;more limiting.&rdquo;<br /><br />&ldquo;The NYIPLA respectfully urges that, despite the broad wording of the question presented, the holding in this case be expressly limited to CBMs (leaving the question for IPRs and PGRs open for decision on another day in a factually more appropriate vehicle),&rdquo; the group wrote.<br /><br />***<br /><br />The NYIPLA is represented by <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a>, <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/dgoldberg/" target="_blank">David P. Goldberg</a> and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/jhahm/" target="_blank">Jung S. Hahm</a> of <a href="https://www.law360.com/firms/amster-rothstein" target="_blank">Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP</a>, Peter Thurlow of <a href="https://www.law360.com/firms/polsinelli" target="_blank">Polsinelli PC</a>, Robert M. Isackson of <a href="https://www.law360.com/firms/leason-ellis" target="_blank">Leason Ellis LLP</a>, and Robert J. Rando of The Rando Law Firm PC.<br /><br />A copy of NYIPLA's Amicus Brief is available <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. Tue, 18 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress12182018/ Amicus Brief of New York Intellectual Property Law Association in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, et al. http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus12172018/ <em><b>Click to download PDF:&nbsp;&nbsp;</b></em><a href="/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf" target="_blank">Amicus Brief of New York Intellectual Property Law Association in Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, et al.</a> Mon, 17 Dec 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus12172018/ The NYIPLA Report:<br>Recent Developments in Patent Law at the U.S. Supreme Court: OIL STATES, SAS INSTITUTE, and WESTERNGECO http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article11292018/ <div style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On April 24, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court (&ldquo;Supreme Court&rdquo;) issued its much-anticipated decisions in <i>Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</i> and </span><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. The first decision reaffirms the constitutionality of <i>inter partes</i> review proceedings and the second rejects current PTAB practice to grant the partial institution of <i>inter partes</i> reviews as ultra vires.&nbsp; Accordingly, these two decisions mean that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office&rsquo;s <i>inter partes</i> review proceedings for the reconsideration of a prior grant of a patent will continue to be available, but only with appropriate procedural adjustments.</span></span></div><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Further, on June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court in <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i> held that the damages provision of 35 U.S.C. &sect; 284 permits recovery of foreign lost profits when infringement is found under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f)(2), expanding the scope of damages under the Patent Act.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Together, this past term at the Supreme Court brought additional insight into the role of Patent Law within our administrative state, and revitalized some theories related to damages law.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">I. Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> </span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">In </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">, the Supreme Court</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">judgment that </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">inter partes</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (U.S. 2018). </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">The decision centered on the debate over whether issued patents are a &ldquo;public right&rdquo; or a &ldquo;private right.&rdquo; The Court had previously recognized that &ldquo;the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights&mdash;specifically, the grant of a public franchise&shy;.&rdquo; </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">Id</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">. at 1373. Therefore, the Court held, because &ldquo;</span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">inter partes</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;"> review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO&rsquo;s authority to conduct that reconsideration,&rdquo; that the PTO can reevaluate the patentability of claims without violating Article III. </span><i style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 10pt; text-align: justify;">Id</i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">. </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">The 7-2 majority opinion of the Court was written by Justice Thomas and joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">&nbsp; </span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif; text-align: justify;">Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts joined.</span><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A. Question Presented</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Supreme Court accepted certiorari on the question of &ldquo;whether <i>inter partes </i>review&mdash;an adversarial process used by the Patent and Trademark Office . . . to analyze the validity of existing patents</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><a name="OLE_LINK2"></a><a name="OLE_LINK1"><span style="font-size: small;">&mdash;</span></a></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">violates the Constitution by extinguishing private property rights through a non-Article III forum without a jury.&rdquo; <i>See</i> </span><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Group, LLC</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">, 137 S. Ct. 2239 (U.S. 2018). </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">B. Background </span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2012 (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;) established a process called <i>inter partes</i> review (&ldquo;IPR&rdquo;) by which the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (&ldquo;PTO&rdquo;) may reconsider and cancel wrongly issued patent claims. The procedure may only be commenced by a third-party petitioner and not by the owner of the patent at issue. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 311(a). The petitioner may file a petition with the PTO seeking cancellation of claims as obvious or anticipated. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 311(b). If there is a &ldquo;reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged,&rdquo; and review is granted, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) will examine the patent&rsquo;s validity. 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 314, 316. Unless the proceeding is settled or dismissed, the PTAB must issue a final written decision, confirming or canceling patent claims. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318. The decision is subject to judicial review by the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. &sect; 319.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In the IPR proceeding below, the PTAB issued a final written decision holding the challenged claims of the patent owned by Oil States Energy Services, LLC (&ldquo;Oil States&rdquo;) to be unpatentable. 138 S. Ct. at 1372. In appealing from the PTAB&rsquo;s decision, Oil States challenged the constitutionality of IPR, arguing that &ldquo;actions to revoke a patent must be tried in an Article III court before a jury.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>.&nbsp; The Federal Circuit affirmed the PTAB&rsquo;s decision because it had already rejected such constitutional arguments in <i>MCM Portfolio LLC v Hewlett-Packard Co.</i> 812 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2015).&nbsp; The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether IPR violates Article III or the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and concluded that it violates neither. 138 S. Ct. at<i> </i>1379<i>.</i>&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">C. Analysis</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In reaching its decision, the Court focused on whether issued patents are a &ldquo;public right&rdquo; or a &ldquo;private right.&rdquo; The Court&rsquo;s &ldquo;precedents have distinguished between &lsquo;public rights&rsquo; and &lsquo;private rights&rsquo;&rdquo; when determining whether a proceeding should involve an &ldquo;exercise of Article III judicial power.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1373. These precedents have given Congress the power &ldquo;to assign adjudication of public rights,&rdquo; as opposed to private rights, to decision-making entities other than Article III federal courts. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Since the grant of a patent has been recognized as a &ldquo;matter involving public rights,&rdquo; &nbsp;and because &ldquo;inter partes review involves the same basic matter as the grant of a patent,&rdquo; the Supreme Court determined that &ldquo;[i]nter partes review falls squarely within the public rights doctrine.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. at 1373-74. Specifically, the Court explained that:</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;margin-left:&#10;1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to <i>grant</i> a patent is a matter involving public rights&mdash;specifically, the grant of a public franchise.&nbsp; Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO&rsquo;s authority to conduct that reconsideration. Thus, the PTO can do so without violating Article III.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1373. </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Citing <i>Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee</i>, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (U.S. 2016), the Court reaffirmed that IPRs are merely a &ldquo;second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent,&rdquo; because &ldquo;[t]he Board considers the same statutory requirements that the PTO considered when granting the patent.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1374. Considering these same statutory requirements prevents the &ldquo;issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from public domain.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. Similar to the initial review of a patent application:</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;margin-left:1.0in;&#10;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">[T]he Board&rsquo;s inter partes review protects &ldquo;the public&rsquo;s paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies are kept within their legitimate scope,&rdquo; <i>Cuozzo</i>. Thus, inter partes review involves the same interests as the determination to grant a patent in the first instance.&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><span style="font-size: small;"><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;margin-left:1.0in;&#10;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></i></p> </span><p style="margin-right:1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. (citations omitted).</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">It &ldquo;does not make a difference&rdquo; that IPR occurs after the issue of a patent. <i>Id</i>. In fact, the grant of a patent claim is subject to the qualification that the PTO has the authority to reexamine, and potentially cancel, the patent claim in IPR. <i>Id</i>. Thus, patents remain subject to the PTAB&rsquo;s authority even after the issue of the patent. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Next, the Court determined that the prior decisions cited by Oil States that recognize patent rights as the &ldquo;private property of the patentee&rdquo; do not contradict the conclusion that IPR does not violate Article III. <i>Id</i>. at 1375. The Court noted that those precedents were decided under the Patent Act of 1870, which did not provide for any post-issuance administrative review, and held that &ldquo;[t]hose precedents . . . are best read as a description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. at 1376.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Court also held that, contrary to the contention by Oil States and the dissent, &ldquo;history does not establish that patent validity is a matter that, &lsquo;from its nature,&rsquo; must be decided by a court.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (citation omitted). The Court explained: </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;margin-left:&#10;1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Historical practice is not decisive here because matters governed by the public rights doctrine &ldquo;from their nature&rdquo; can be resolved in multiple ways: Congress can &ldquo;reserve to itself the power to decide,&rdquo; &ldquo;delegate that power to executive officers,&rdquo; or &ldquo;commit it to judicial tribunals.&rdquo;&nbsp; That Congress chose the courts in the past does not foreclose its choice of the PTO today.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1378 (citation omitted). </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In addition, the Court rejected Oil States&rsquo;s argument that IPR violates Article III based on the similarities between the various procedures used in IPR and typical court procedures, noting that:&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;margin-left:&#10;1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">[T]his Court has never adopted a &ldquo;looks like&rdquo; test to determine if an adjudication has improperly occurred outside of an Article III court.&nbsp; The fact that an agency uses court-like procedures does not necessarily mean it is exercising the judicial power.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. (citation omitted).&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Finally, the Court determined that IPR does not violate the Seventh Amendment, because &ldquo;when Congress properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. at 1379 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Emphasizing the narrowness of its holding, the Court noted that its decision only addresses the constitutionality of IPR and that it does not consider &ldquo;whether inter partes review would be constitutional without any sort of intervention by a court at any stage of the proceedings.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).&nbsp; The Court also explained that &ldquo;Oil States does not challenge the retroactive application of inter partes review, even though that procedure was not in place when its patent issued.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. Finally, the Court cautioned against misconstruing its decision &ldquo;as suggesting that patents are not property for purposes of the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (citations omitted).</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">D. Concurrence</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><span style="font-size: small;"><p style="text-align:justify"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></b></p> </span><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Sotomayor, concurred, emphasizing that the Court&rsquo;s conclusion does not necessarily bar private rights from being adjudicated in anything other than by Article III courts. &nbsp;<i>Id</i>. (Breyer, J., concurring).</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><i><o:p></o:p></i></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">E. Dissent </span></b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Justice Gorsuch&rsquo;s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, analogized a patent to a &ldquo;personal right-no less than a home or a farm,&rdquo; and argued that patent rights should be adjudicated by Article III courts. <i>Id</i>. at 1380 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, patentees can only be divested of patent rights by Article III judges. <i>Id</i>. Disputing the Court&rsquo;s equation of grant and revocation, the dissent argued that just because one gives a gift, such as a patent, does not mean that one can forever enjoy the right to reclaim it. <i>Id.</i> at 1385. Such a stance, they viewed, is &ldquo;a retreat from Article III&rsquo;s guarantees.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>at 1386.</span></span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">II. SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> </span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On the same day that the <i>Oil States </i>decision was issued, the Supreme Court also issued a 5-4 opinion in <i>SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu</i> that reversed the decision of the Federal Circuit and held that &ldquo;the petitioner in an <i>inter partes </i>review is entitled to a decision on all the claims it has challenged.&rdquo; 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1358 (U.S. 2018).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The majority opinion, written by Justice Gorsuch and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, concluded that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) provides a &ldquo;clear&rdquo; answer, because &ldquo;any&rdquo; in this statutory provision means &ldquo;every.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1353. The decision focuses heavily on the plain language of the statute and determined that &ldquo;everything in the statute before [the Court] confirms that [petitioner] is entitled to a final written decision addressing<b><i> </i></b><i>all of the claims it has challenged</i> and nothing suggests [that the Court] lack[s] the power to say so[.]&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1360. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A. Question Presented</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><span style="font-size: small;"><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></b></p> </span><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question: &ldquo;Does 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a), which provides that the Patent Trial and Appeal Board in an inter partes review &lsquo;shall issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner,&rsquo; require that Board to issue a final written decision as to every claim challenged by the petitioner, or does it allow that Board to issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of only some of the patent claims challenged by the petitioner, as the Federal Circuit held?&rdquo; <i>SAS Institute Inc. v. Lee</i>, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (U.S. 2017).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">B. Background</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">By way of background, this case began when SAS Institute Inc. (&ldquo;SAS&rdquo;) petitioned for IPR of ComplementSoft, LLC&rsquo;s (&ldquo;ComplementSoft&rdquo;) software patent. <i>Id</i>. at 1353.&nbsp; In its petition, SAS alleged that all 16 of the patent&rsquo;s claims were unpatentable.<i>&nbsp; </i>The PTAB concluded that SAS likely would succeed with respect to at least one of the claims and that an IPR was warranted.&nbsp; However, the PTAB did not institute review on all of the challenged claims in the petition, and instead, only instituted review on some of the claims while denying review on the rest.&nbsp; The final written decision ultimately issued by the PTAB did not address those claims on which the PTAB refused to institute review. <i>SAS</i>, 138 S. Ct. at 1354. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">SAS appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) required the PTAB to decide the patentability of <i>every</i> claim a petitioner challenges in its petition, not just some. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The relevant statute addressed by the <i>SAS </i>Court, as applied to IPRs, provides:</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.6in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:.6in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">(a) Final Written Decision&mdash;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.6in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:.6in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">If an <i>inter partes</i> review is instituted and not dismissed under this chapter, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board <b><i>shall</i></b> issue a final written decision with respect to the patentability of <b><i>any</i></b> patent claim challenged by the petitioner and <b><i>any</i></b> new claim added under section 316(d).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) (emphasis added). </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Federal Circuit rejected SAS&rsquo;s argument<i> </i>and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the question for itself. <i>SAS</i>, 137 S. Ct. at 2160.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">C. Analysis</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The majority of the Court found that the plain language of the text of 35 U.S.C. &sect; 318(a) &ldquo;supplies a ready answer.&rdquo;<i> SAS</i>, 138 S. Ct. at 1354. <i>&nbsp;</i>In particular, the Court focused on interpretation of the terms &ldquo;shall&rdquo; and &ldquo;any&rdquo; in the statute. While &ldquo;shall&rdquo; tends to &ldquo;impose[] a nondiscretionary duty,&rdquo; the &ldquo;any&rdquo; carries a more &ldquo;expansive meaning.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i>&nbsp; Therefore, the Court determined that the statute requires that &ldquo;the Board <i>must</i> address <i>every</i> claim the petitioner has challenged.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>(emphasis added).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In reaching the decision, the Court rejected the notion that the Director of the Patent Office (&ldquo;Director&rdquo;) retains a discretionary &ldquo;partial institution&rdquo; power since such power does not appear anywhere in the statute. Instead, the Court explained:</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:1.0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Much as in the civil litigation system it mimics, in an inter partes review the petitioner is master of its complaint and normally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1355.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><b><o:p></o:p></b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In this connection, the Court observed that &ldquo;[f]rom the outset, we see that Congress chose to structure a process in which it&rsquo;s the petitioner, not the Director, who gets to define the contours of the proceeding.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><b><o:p></o:p></b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">35 U.S.C. &sect; 314(a) provides that the Director may not institute an IPR unless &ldquo;there is a reasonable likelihood&rdquo; that the petitioner will prevail on at least one of the challenged claims. <i>Id</i>. at 1356. However, the Court rejected the Director&rsquo;s argument that the this statutory provision on institution of <i>inter partes</i> review supports the Director&rsquo;s &ldquo;partial institution&rdquo; power because, &ldquo;while &sect; 314(a) invests the Director with discretion on the question <i>whether</i> to institute review, it doesn&rsquo;t follow that the statute affords him discretion regarding <i>what</i> claims that review will encompass.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. &nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Director also argued that because language of the statute requires him to &ldquo;evaluate claims individually,&rdquo; it, therefore, allows him to institute review on a claim-by-claim basis. However, the Court reasoned: </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:1.0in;margin-bottom:0in;&#10;margin-left:1.0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Section 314(a) . . . simply requires [the Director] to decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on &ldquo;at least 1&rdquo; claim.&nbsp; Once that single claim threshold is satisfied, it doesn&rsquo;t matter whether the petitioner is likely to prevail on any additional claims; the Director need not even consider any other claim before instituting review. Rather than contemplate claim-by-claim institution, then, the language anticipates a regime where a reasonable prospect of success on a single claim justifies review of all. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-right:1.0in;text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Id</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">. at 1356. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><b><o:p></o:p></b></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Director&rsquo;s argument that the statute is ambiguous on the propriety of the partial institution practice was flatly denied.&nbsp; &ldquo;[A]fter applying traditional tools of interpretation here, we are left with no uncertainty that could warrant deference&rdquo; to the Director&rsquo;s interpretation under <i>Chevron USA Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc</i>., 467 US 837 (1984). <i>Id</i>. at 1538. &ldquo;There is no room in this [statutory] scheme for a wholly unmentioned &lsquo;partial institution&rsquo; power that lets the Director select only some challenged claims for decision.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Court also rejected the Director&rsquo;s argument that judicial review of the question of whether the partial institution practice is permitted under the statute is itself foreclosed by 35 U.S.C. &sect; 314(d) and previous Supreme Court precedent in <i>Cuozzo</i>.&nbsp; The Court determined that the Director &ldquo;overread[] both the statute and [the Court&rsquo;s] precedent,&rdquo; and held that judicial review remains available to determine whether the Director exceeded his statutory authority by limiting IPR to fewer than all of the claims the petitioner challenged. <i>Id</i>. at 1360.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Finally, the Court rejected the Director&rsquo;s policy argument on the efficiency of partial institution, noting that &ldquo;[p]olicy arguments are properly addressed to Congress, not this Court.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1358. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Ultimately, the Court decided that &ldquo;everything in the statute before [the Court] confirms that [petitioner] is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the claims it has challenged and nothing suggests [that the Court] lack[s] the power to say so[.]&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1360.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 15pt; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">D. Dissenting Opinions</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In a dissent, Justice Ginsburg described the majority&rsquo;s reading of the statute as &ldquo;wooden&rdquo; and lacking of any true understanding of congressional intent. <i>Id</i>. at 1360 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).&nbsp; Justice Ginsburg also fully supported Justice Breyer&rsquo;s dissenting opinion. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In his separate dissent, Justice Breyer argued that the statute is ambiguous and that the PTO&rsquo;s interpretation is reasonable. His dissent observes that, under <i>Chevron</i>, an agency is granted leeway to enact rules that are reasonable in light of the text, nature, and purpose of an ambiguous statute. <i>Id</i>. at 1364 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He explained that, &ldquo;there is a gap, the agency possesses gap-filling authority, and it filled the gap with a regulation that . . . is a reasonable exercise of that authority.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 1365. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; line-height: 15pt; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">E. The PTO&rsquo;s Response to the <i>SAS </i>Decision</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On April 26, 2018, just two days after the <i>SAS </i>decision, the PTAB issued guidance on the effects the Supreme Court&rsquo;s decision would have on the IPR process and other AIA proceedings. &nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The PTAB&rsquo;s new guidelines clarify that from April 26 on, &ldquo;[a]s required by the decision, the PTAB will <i>institute as to all claims or none</i>,&rdquo; and if a trial is instituted, the PTAB will institute on &ldquo;all challenges raised in the petition,&rdquo; Memorandum from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board on Guidance on the Impact of <i>SAS </i>on AIA Proceedings (Apr. 26, 2018),&nbsp; </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><a href="https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial" target="_blank"><span style="font-size: small;">https://www.uspto.gov/patents-application-process/patent-trial-and-appeal-board/trials/guidance-impact-sas-aia-trial</span></a><span style="font-size: small;"> (emphasis added).&nbsp; In other words, a petition will either be granted in its entirety, or denied in its entirety. <i>Id</i>. </span><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">For cases in which the PTAB has already instituted an IPR on only some (but not all) of the challenges raised in the petition, &ldquo;the panel may issue an order supplementing the institution decision to institute on all challenges raised in the petition.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>The PTAB panel may then take further action to manage the trial proceeding, including, for example, permitting additional time, briefing, discovery, and/or oral argument, depending on various circumstances and the stage of the proceeding. <i>Id.</i></span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Finally, the new guidelines specify that &ldquo;upon receipt of an order supplementing the institution decision, the petitioner and patent owner <i>shall meet and confer<b> </b></i>to discuss the need for additional briefing and/or any other adjustments to the schedule. While the Board may act <i>sua sponte </i>in some cases, <i>additional briefing and schedule adjustments might not be ordered if not requested by the parties</i>.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id</i>. (emphasis added). The parties may agree to <i>affirmatively waive additional briefing or schedule changes,</i>&rdquo; and contact the Board to discuss any request. <i>Id.</i> (emphasis added).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">As for the scope of the final written decision, it &ldquo;will address, to the extent claims are still pending at the time of decision, all patent claims challenged by the petitioner and all new claims added through the amendment process.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i></span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-bottom: 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Concurrent with the issued guidance, the PTAB designated as informative its order in <i>Western Digital Corp. v. SPEX Techs., Inc.</i>, IPR2018-00082, Paper 11 (PTAB Apr. 25, 2018). In this case, IPR was instituted on all of four grounds against 11 claims presented in the petition, even though only two grounds against two claims met the reasonable likelihood threshold.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin: 0in 0in 0.0001pt; text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><br /> Additionally, as a sample order supplementing an institution decision, <i>Emerson Elec. Co. v. IPCO, LLC</i>, IPR2017-00213, Paper 41 (PTAB Apr. 26, 2018), was recognized as being informative for amending the institution decision to include review of all claims and all grounds presented in the petition, and to asking whether the parties desire any changes to the schedule or additional briefing.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Lastly, </span><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">SK Hynix Inc. v. Netlist, Inc</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">., IPR2017-00548, Paper 25 at 16 (PTAB May 3, 2018), was recognized as being a sample post-<i>SAS</i> final written decision. The final written decision addressed only the instituted grounds (two out of five grounds presented in the petition), but authorized the parties to file a rehearing request<b><i> </i></b>&ldquo;[t]o the extent either Patent Owner or Petitioner believes that the Court&rsquo;s decision in <i>SAS Institute </i>requires additional consideration in this proceeding.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">III. <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i></span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><i><o:p></o:p></i></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">On June 22, 2018, the Supreme Court in <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i> reversed the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision, and held in a 7-2 decision that a patent owner can collect lost foreign profits. 138 S. Ct. 2129 (U.S. 2018).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The majority opinion authored by Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor and Kagan, confirmed that the presumption against extraterritoriality does not preclude patent owners from recovering lost profits that arise from infringement resulting from conduct outside of the United States. The majority opinion concentrated on &ldquo;the focus&rdquo; of the statute, and whether that &ldquo;focus&rdquo; can be said to have occurred domestically. <i>Id</i>. at 2137-38.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-left: 0.25in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">A.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: " times="" new="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Question Presented</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&#10;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco</span></i><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"> addressed an important question regarding whether a patent owner can recover damages for a defendant&rsquo;s activities outside the United States. Specifically, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of &ldquo;whether the court of appeals erred in holding that lost profits arising from prohibited combinations occurring outside of the United States are categorically unavailable in cases where patent infringement is proven under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f).&rdquo; <i>See</i> <i>WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp.</i>, 138 S. Ct. 734 (U.S. 2018).</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;&#10;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-left: 0.25in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">B.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: " times="" new="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Background</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco LLC (&ldquo;WesternGeco&rdquo;) owns patents for a system used to scan the ocean floor for oil and gas deposits.&nbsp; <i>WesternGeco</i>, 138 S. Ct. at 2135. ION Geophysical Corp. (&ldquo;ION&rdquo;) began selling a competing system that was built from components manufactured in the United States. <i>Id</i>. The components were shipped by ION to companies abroad, which then assembled the components to create a system that is indistinguishable from&mdash;and competes with&mdash;that of WesternGeco. <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco brought suit against ION alleging patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f)(2) of the Patent Act, thereby arguing its entitlement to damages to compensate for infringement under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 284. <i>Id</i>. &nbsp;&nbsp;</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas found ION liable for infringement, and awarded WesternGeco $93.4 million in damages. <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">ION appealed to the Federal Circuit, arguing that WesternGeco could not recover damages for lost profits because &sect; 271(f) does not apply extraterritorially. Because it had previously held that the general infringement provision, &sect; 271(a), does not allow patent owners to recover for lost foreign sales, the Federal Circuit reasoned that &sect; 271(f) should be interpreted in the same way. <i>Id</i>. Therefore, the Federal Circuit held that WesternGeco was not entitled to damages for lost foreign profits. <i>Id</i>.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="text-align: justify; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">WesternGeco petitioned for review in the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on the question of whether the general damages provision, 35 U.S.C. &sect; 284, permits recovery of foreign lost profits for infringement under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 271(f)(2). <i>Id</i>. at 2135-36.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="rtejustify" style="margin-left: 0.5in; text-align: justify; text-indent: -0.25in; line-height: 15pt; background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="font-size: small;"><!--[if !supportLists]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">C.<span style="font-variant-numeric: normal; font-variant-east-asian: normal; font-weight: normal; font-stretch: normal; line-height: normal; font-family: " times="" new="">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span></span></b><!--[endif]--><b><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Analysis</span></b></span><b><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: Arial, sans-serif;"><o:p></o:p></span></b></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Reversing the decision of the Federal Circuit below, the Supreme Court concluded that WesternGeco&rsquo;s award for lost foreign profits attributable to domestic acts of infringement under 35 USC &sect; 271(f)(2) was a permissible domestic application of &sect; 284. <i>Id</i>. at 2139. The Court determined that the &ldquo;focus&rdquo; of &sect; 284 was &ldquo;infringement,&rdquo; and that the infringement at issue &mdash;namely the supplying of components&mdash;was domestic. <i>Id</i>. at 2138. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Because Congress is said to generally legislate with domestic concerns in mind, and to prevent dispute between our laws and those of other nations, the presumption of the Courts is that federal statutes only &ldquo;apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 2136. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">&nbsp;</span></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">The Supreme Court has established a two-step framework for determining questions of extraterritoriality. <i>Id</i>. <b><i>First</i></b>, a court asks &ldquo;whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been rebutted.&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. To be considered rebutted, the text must provide a &ldquo;clear indication of an extraterritorial application.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>If the presumption against extraterritoriality has not been rebutted, the <b><i>second</i></b> step is to ask &ldquo;whether the case involves a domestic application of the statute.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>This determination is made by identifying the &ldquo;focus&rdquo; of the statute, and asking &ldquo;whether the conduct relevant to that focus occurred in the United States territory.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the case involves a permissible domestic application of the statute. <i>Id.</i></span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">While it is preferable to begin the analysis at step one, courts have discretion to begin with step two in &ldquo;appropriate cases,&rdquo; where addressing step one would require resolving &ldquo;difficult questions&rdquo; that do not change &ldquo;the outcome of the case&rdquo; but could have far-reaching effects in future cases. <i>Id. </i>In this case, the Court decided to exercise the discretion to begin with step two. <i>Id.</i> at 2136-37.</span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">In determining whether the case involves domestic applications of the statutes, the second step requires consideration of the &ldquo;focus&rdquo; of the statutes. <i>Id</i>. at 1237. The Court explained, the &ldquo;&lsquo;focus&rsquo; of a statute is the &lsquo;objec[t] of [its] solicitude,&rsquo; which can include the conduct it &lsquo;seeks to regulate,&rsquo; as well as the parties and interests it &lsquo;seeks to protect[t]&rsquo; or vindicate.&rsquo;&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>The case involves permissible domestic application of the statute if the conduct relevant to the statute&rsquo;s focus occurred in the United States. However, regardless of any other conduct that occurred within the United States, if the relevant conduct occurs in another country, the extraterritorial application of the statute is impermissible. <i>Id</i>. </span></span><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"><o:p></o:p></span><span style="font-size: small;"><br /></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: small;"><span style="font-family: Arial, sans-serif;">Applying the above principles to the statutes at issue in the case at hand, the Court concluded that the conduct relevant to the statutory focus in the case was domest</span></span></p> Thu, 29 Nov 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article11292018/ Evidence in Patent Cases - General Provisions http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article11192018/ Success in patent litigation often turns on the ability or inability to admit or exclude evidence. Evidence in Patent Cases explains the use of evidence as it relates specifically to the issues encountered in patent litigation from case initiation through appeal. The authors, a team of experienced patent litigators, share insight, analysis, practice notes, and case citations, making this book very handy for litigators looking to object or overcome an objection with solid case law at their fingertips. <br /><br />The book&rsquo;s unique format is divided into two distinct parts. Part I provides case strategy and analysis in patent cases viewed through the lens of the evidence required to achieve the patent litigator&rsquo;s objective during each stage of litigation and appeal, giving the reader a comprehensive understanding of evidentiary issues as they arise in patent litigation. <br /><br />Part II provides the full text of each Federal Rule of Evidence, formatted for quick and easy location and reading, and the authors analyze each rule in the context of patent litigation, offers explanatory commentary, practice tips, and a collection of annotated case digests showing application of the rules to the facts of the patent case to give patent litigators a quick and easy reference to quickly find support for evidentiary positions during the heat of pre-trial, trial, and/or hearings involving the introduction of evidence.<br /><br />Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP&nbsp;attorneys authored the &quot;General Provisions&quot; chapter of the book.<br /><br /><em>Evidence in Patent Cases</em> is available for purchase through <a href="https://www.bna.com/evidence-patent-cases-p73014481590/" target="_blank">Bloomberg BNA</a>. Mon, 19 Nov 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article11192018/ Getting the Deal Through: Trademarks 2019 - United States http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/articleoct2018/ Getting the Deal Through&nbsp;works with many of the best lawyers and law firms in the world to bring together a unique legal information resource, written by experts on each subject area, in every significant jurisdiction.<br /><br />Expert local insight into the major trademark law issues across multiple jurisdictions, covering: ownership and scope of trademarks, application for registration, appeal of failed applications, third-party opposition to registration, duration and maintenance of marks, assignment, markings, types of trademark enforcement proceedings, procedural format and timing, discovery, litigation costs, defences and remedies and appeals.<br /><br /><div>Getting the Deal Through provides international expert analysis in key areas of law, practice and regulation for corporate counsel, cross-border legal practitioners, and company directors and officers. Throughout this edition, and following the unique Getting the Deal Through format, the same key questions are answered by leading practitioners in each of the jurisdictions featured.<br /><br />Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP attorneys authored the &quot;United States&quot; chapter of the book.</div><br /><em>Getting the Deal Through: Trademarks</em>&nbsp;is available for purchase or download via&nbsp;<a href="https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/40/trademarks/" target="_blank">Getting The Deal Through</a>.<br type="_moz" /> Wed, 31 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/articleoct2018/ ARE Trademark Law Alert:<br>US Patent & Trademark Office Considers Rule Change for Foreign Trademark Applicants<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert10242018/ (October 24, 2018)&nbsp; In a September 24, 2018 address to the Intellectual Property Owners&rsquo; Association, US Patent &amp; Trademark Office (&ldquo;USPTO&rdquo;) Director Andrei Iancu announced that he was considering a rule change to restrict&nbsp; <i>pro se</i> trademark applications by foreign nationals.&nbsp; Current rules allow foreign nationals to file US trademark applications without having legal representation.&nbsp; The new rule would change this by requiring foreign trademark applicants to be represented by US attorneys.<div>&nbsp;</div> <div>The change is intended to address the marked increase in <i>pro se</i> trademark applications by foreign nationals, especially from China.&nbsp; Over the past 6 years, the number of trademark applications from China has risen almost 1100 percent.&nbsp; Many of these applications have been filed without the benefit of legal advice.&nbsp; As a result, the USPTO has needed to hire, train, and integrate within a short time period a large number of new Trademark Examining Attorneys.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>Complicating the issue is the fact that many of the foreign <i>pro se </i>applications are of questionable quality.&nbsp; Some include long and improbable lists of goods and services to be covered by the application.&nbsp; Others seek protection for close variants of world-famous trademarks, such as &ldquo;iFone.&rdquo;&nbsp; Such applications underscore how important it is for US trademark owners to be vigilant in monitoring the US Trademark Register for applications that may confuse consumers.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>We think the change that is now being considered&mdash;requiring foreign applicants to retail US legal counsel in order to file trademark applications&mdash;may alleviate the USPTO&rsquo;s problems.&nbsp; But in any event, whether or not this change eases the total number of trademark applications filed, requiring foreign applicants to obtain US legal representation should at least ensure that such applicants obtain the benefit of trained legal advice.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>We will continue to monitor this possible rule change and will issue further ARE Trademark Law Alerts as developments occur.&nbsp; In the meantime, please contact us if you have questions about how this possible rule change may affect your trademark rights.</div> <div><br />* <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/mvern/" target="_blank">Max Vern</a> is a partner and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/dgoldberg/" target="_blank">David P. Goldberg</a> is an associate at Amster, Rothstein and Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including obtaining and enforcing trademark and other intellectual property rights. They may be reached at mvern@arelaw.com and dgoldberg@arelaw.com. <br />&nbsp;</div> Wed, 24 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert10242018/ BLOOMBERG/BNA REPORTS ON FIRM WIN FOR CLIENT STEVE MADDEN IN TRADE DRESS CASE AT SECOND CIRCUIT http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress10232018/ (October 23, 2018) <br /><br />For full article please see: <a href="https://www.bna.com/steven-madden-shoe-n57982093213/" target="_blank">https://www.bna.com/steven-madden-shoe-n57982093213/</a><div>&nbsp;</div><div>Partners&nbsp;<a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/alocicero/" target="_blank">Anthony F. Lo Cicero</a>,&nbsp;<a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/miro/" target="_blank">Douglas Miro</a>&nbsp;and Associate&nbsp;<a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/bcharkow/" target="_blank">Benjamin Charkow</a> from Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP represented Steven Madden.<br /><br />A copy of decision can be found <a href="https://www.bloomberglaw.com/public/desktop/document/Eliya_Inc_v_Steven_Madden_Ltd_No_18831_2018_BL_389669_2d_Cir_Oct_?1540401139" target="_blank">HERE</a>.</div> Tue, 23 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress10232018/ Practical Law:<br>Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw081618/ <strong>REVISED&nbsp; October 18, 2018 --&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/20181018%20Understanding%20PTAB%20Trials%20Key%20Milestones%20in%20IPR%20PGR%20and%20CBM%20Proceedings%20(3-578-8846).pdf" target="_blank">Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings</a></strong> Thu, 18 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw081618/ ARE PTAB Alert:<br>PTAB Adopts Phillip’s Style Claim Construction Standard for IPRs, PGRs and CBMs Filed on or after November, 13, 2018<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert10112018/ (October 11, 2018) On October 10, 2018, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) issued its much anticipated final rule with respect to claim construction in post-issuance proceedings. Specifically, the USPTO issued a new claim construction standard with respect to America Invents Act trials and proceedings, including inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and the transitional program for covered business method patents (CBM) before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The new claim construction standard will be in effect for all petitions filed on or after November 13, 2018.<br /><br />The final rule issued by the USPTO replaces the PTAB&rsquo;s &ldquo;broadest reasonable interpretation&rdquo; standard with the claim construction standard applied by Federal District Courts in civil actions under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 282(b), the same standard articulated in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For new petitions filed on or after November 13, &ldquo;a claim of a patent, or a claim proposed in a motion to amend ..., shall be construed using the same claim construction standard that would be used to construe the claim in a civil action under 35 U.S.C. 282(b), including construing the claim in accordance with the ordinary and customary meaning of such claim as understood by one of ordinary skill in the art and the prosecution history pertaining to the patent. Any prior claim construction determination concerning a term of the claim in a civil action, or a proceeding before the International Trade Commission, that is timely made of record in the ... proceeding will be considered.&rdquo; 37 CFR 42.100(b), 42.200(b) and 42.300(b).<br /><br />The &ldquo;broadest reasonable interpretation&rdquo; standard remains in effect for petitions challenging unexpired patent claims filed by November12, 2018. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact one of our lawyers.<br /><br />A text version of the USPTO final rule can be found <a href="https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/10/11/2018-22006/changes-to-the-claim-construction-standard-for-interpreting-claims-in-trial-proceedings-before-the" target="_blank">here</a>.<br /><br />* <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a> is a partner, <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/jhahm/" target="_blank">Jung Hahm</a> is a senior counsel, and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/mjones/" target="_blank">Michael Jones</a> is an associate at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. He may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, jhahm@arelaw.com and mjones@arelaw.com. Thu, 11 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert10112018/ In The Press: <br>2018 New York Metro Super Lawyers Names Nine (9) Lawyers From Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein LLP<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress10072018/ Congratulations to Partners Daniel S. Ebenstein, Anthony F. Lo Cicero, Charles R. Macedo, Douglas A. Miro and Neil Zipkin and Senior Counsel Richard S. Mandaro from Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP for being named as Intellectual Property Super Lawyers in the New York Metro 2018 Super Lawyers Guide. Also congratulations for Senior Counsel Mark Berkowitz and Associate Sandra A. Hudak for being named as Intellectual Property Litigation Rising Stars and Associate Jessica Capasso as an Intellectual Property Rising Star in the New York Metro 2018 Super Lawyers Guide. Special Congratulations to Partner Douglas A. Miro on also being named a Top 100 Super Lawyer.<br /><br /><strong>Partners:</strong><br /><br /><div><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/debenstein/" target="_blank">Daniel S. Ebenstein</a></b>&nbsp;<br />Intellectual Property&nbsp;<br />Selected to Super Lawyers 2006, 2013 - 2018</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/alocicero/" target="_blank">Anthony F. Lo Cicero</a></b>&nbsp;<br />Intellectual Property&nbsp;<br />Selected to Super Lawyers 2007 - 2018</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a></b>&nbsp;<br />Intellectual Property&nbsp;<br />Selected to Super Lawyers 2011 - 2018</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/miro/" title="https://profiles.superlawyers.com/new-york-metro/new-york/lawyer/douglas-a-miro/08f1f4ef-2702-4537-9fc9-802e785143fa.htmlCmd+Click to follow link" target="_blank">Douglas A. Miro</a></b>&nbsp;</div><div>Intellectual Property, Intellectual Property Litigation&nbsp;</div><div>Selected to Super Lawyers 2006, 2009 - 2018</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/nzipkin/" target="_blank">Neil M. Zipkin</a></b>&nbsp;<br />Intellectual Property, Intellectual Property Litigation, Alternative Dispute Resolution&nbsp;<br />Selected to Super Lawyers 2006, 2013 - 2018</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div><strong>Senior Counsel:<br /><br /></strong><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/rmandaro/">Richard S. Mandaro</a></b>&nbsp;<br />Intellectual Property&nbsp;<br />Selected to Super Lawyers 2013 - 2018<br /><br /><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/mberkowitz/" target="_blank">Mark Berkowitz</a></b>&nbsp;<br />Intellectual Property Litigation&nbsp;<br />Rising Stars 2015 - 2018<br /><br /><strong>Associates:</strong></div><div><strong><br type="_moz" /></strong></div><div><b><a href="http://www.arelaw.com/professional/shudak/" target="_blank">Sandra A. Hudak</a></b>&nbsp;<br />Intellectual Property Litigation, Intellectual Property&nbsp;<br />Rising Stars 2018</div><div>&nbsp;</div><div><b><a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/jcapasso/" target="_blank">Jessica Capasso</a></b></div><div>Intellectual Property Litigation&nbsp;<br />Rising Stars 2018<br />&nbsp;</div>The firm is proud of its Super Lawyers. The firm's listing with Super Lawyers can be found here:<br /><br /><a href="http://digital.superlawyers.com/superlawyers/nyslrs18/MobilePagedReplica.action?pm=1&amp;folio=82#pg82" target="_blank">http://digital.superlawyers.com/superlawyers/nyslrs18/MobilePagedReplica.action?pm=1&amp;folio=82#pg82</a><br type="_moz" /> Sun, 07 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress10072018/ IPWatchdog<br>Is the Presumption of Validity Dead in Substitute Claims Issued as a Result of Motions to Amend After PTAB Proceedings?<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/10042018article/ In a White Paper published by Askeladden LLC&rsquo;s Patent Quality Initiative, we analyze the proper role of a the presumption of validity for claims that have been amended in post-issuance proceedings like Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceedings under the Smith-Leahy American Invents Act (AIA).&nbsp; A full copy of our paper is available here.&nbsp; The following is an excerpt discussing our thesis and conclusion that the presumption of validity should not apply to substitute claims, since such claims have never been fully examined and thus not entitled to the presumption that they were.<div>&nbsp;</div><div>Under Section 282 of the Patent Act of 1952, &ldquo;[a] patent shall be presumed valid&rdquo; and &ldquo;[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.&rdquo; 35 U.S.C. &sect; 282 (2018).&nbsp; As Judge Rich, one of the authors of the 1952 Patent Act explained, the rationale for this presumption is based on &ldquo;the basic proposition that a government agency such as the [PTO] was presumed to do its job.&rdquo; American Hoist &amp; Derrick Co. v. Sowa &amp; Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984).&nbsp; This presumption makes sense in the context of the statutory scheme of the 1952 Act which first codified this presumption, where a patent application follows an &ldquo;inquisitorial process between patent owner and examiner.&rdquo; See SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018).&nbsp; &nbsp;Thus, the examiner, acting on behalf of the government, can be presumed to have performed his or her job if and when a patent claims issue.</div><div><br />However, in 2011, under the Smith-Leahy American Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;), unlike the original prosecution, or even traditional <em>ex parte</em> reexamination, &ldquo;the petitioner is master of its complaint and nor&shy;mally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address.&rdquo; <em>Id. </em>at 1355 ; <em>see id.</em> at 1356 (&ldquo;[T]he petitioner&rsquo;s petition, not the Director&rsquo;s discretion, is supposed to guide the life of the [<em>inter partes</em> review] litigation.&rdquo;).&nbsp;&nbsp; To the extent that all the PTAB is performing is &ldquo;a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent,&rdquo;<a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/insco20180424e88" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em> Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Grp.</em>,</a> 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 (2018) (quoting <a href="https://www.leagle.com/decision/insco20160620c07" target="_blank" rel="noopener"><em>Cuozzo Speed Techn. LLC v. Lee</em></a>, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)), continuing to apply this presumption to claims that survive a PTAB proceeding (like an <em>inter partes</em> review) continues to make sense.&nbsp; After all, the government did its job in the first instance in the original inquisitorial examination, and a third party challenger was unable to demonstrate error.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/10/04/presumption-validity-substitute-claims-ptab-proceedings/id=101958/" target="_blank">Full article</a></div> Thu, 04 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/10042018article/ IPWatchdog<br>Can the Federal Circuit Refuse an Appeal by a Non-defendant Petitioner in an IPR?<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article-10012018/ On Tuesday, September 18, 2018, Askeladden L.L.C. (&ldquo;Askeladden&rdquo;) filed an amicus brief supporting Appellant&rsquo;s Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc in JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd., No. 2017-1828 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See Patent Quality Initiative&rsquo;s website for the full brief. This case raises the important question of whether the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) can refuse to hear an appeal by a non-defendant petitioner from an adverse final written decision in an inter partes review (&ldquo;IPR&rdquo;) proceeding, on the basis of a lack of a patent-inflicted injury-in-fact, when Congress has statutorily created the right for &ldquo;dissatisfied&rdquo; parties to appeal to the Federal Circuit.<br /><p>Askeladden supported the merits of JTEKT Corp.&rsquo;s (&ldquo;JTEKT&rdquo;) underlying petition, including JTEKT&rsquo;s argument that the Court should grant rehearing <em>en banc</em> to address injuries beyond patent-inflicted injuries.&nbsp; Specifically, Askeladden agreed with JTEKT&rsquo;s assertions that the estoppel provisions of the IPR statute independently constitute a real and substantial injury sufficient to establish standing between competitors and that the panel&rsquo;s decision is contrary to statute and precedent.&nbsp; Askeladden argued that it believes that the Federal Circuit should rehear the issues presented <em>en banc</em> to clarify the law of standing for petitioners on appeal from an adverse finestoppejh;hjg&rsquo;lhk;glkh;hgal written decisions of the PTAB in IPRs.</p><p>In the proceedings below, JTEKT filed a petition requesting IPR, pursuant to the relevant statutory scheme devised by Congress in the America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 311-319. &nbsp;The PTAB later issued a final written decision, holding the challenged claims of the patent not unpatentable.<br /><br /><a href="http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2018/10/01/federal-circuit-refuse-appeal-non-defendant-petitioner-ipr/id=101799/" target="_blank">Full Article</a></p> Mon, 01 Oct 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article-10012018/ Is the Presumption of Validity Dead in Substitute Claims Issued as a Result of Motions to Amend After PTAB Proceedings?<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article09282018/ INTRODUCTION<br /><br />Under Section 282 of the Patent Act of 1952, &ldquo;[a] patent shall be presumed valid&rdquo; and &ldquo;[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.&rdquo; 35 U.S.C. &sect; 282 (2018). As Judge Rich, one of the authors of the 1952 Patent Act explained, the rationale for this presumption is based on &ldquo;the basic proposition that a government agency such as the [PTO] was presumed to do its job.&rdquo; American Hoist &amp; Derrick Co. v. Sowa &amp; Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This presumption makes sense in the context of the statutory scheme of the 1952 Act which first codified this presumption, where a patent application follows an &ldquo;inquisitorial process between patent owner and examiner.&rdquo; See SAS Institute, Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1353 (2018). Thus, the examiner, acting on behalf of the government, can be presumed to have performed his or her job if and when a patent claims issue.<br /><br />However, in 2011, under the Smith-Leahy American Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;), unlike the original prosecution, or even traditional ex parte reexamination, &ldquo;the petitioner is master of its complaint and normally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address.&rdquo; Id. at 1355 ; see id. at 1356 (&ldquo;[T]he petitioner&rsquo;s petition, not the Director&rsquo;s discretion, is supposed to guide the life of the [inter partes review] litigation.&rdquo;). To the extent that all the PTAB is performing is &ldquo;a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent,&rdquo; Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene&rsquo;s Energy Grp., 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 (2018) (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techn. LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016)), continuing to apply this presumption to claims that survive a PTAB proceeding (like an inter partes review) continues to make sense. After all, the government did its job in the first instance in the original inquisitorial examination, and a third party challenger was unable to demonstrate error.<br /><br />However, since the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision in Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal confirmed that the burden of persuasion on a the patentability of amended claims in a motion to amend in an inter partes review proceeding (and presumably other post issuance PTAB proceedings) is placed on the petitioner, the theoretical rationale for Section 282(a)&rsquo;s presumption of validity is no longer present for such amended claims. 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (en banc). In particular, there is no government agency that is tasked with performing the inquisitorial examination that gave rise to the original presumption. How can there be a presumption that the government agent charged with examining the patent claims did his or her job, when there is no such person assigned to perform that job?<br /><br />In Part I of this paper, we examine the historical roots of Section 282(a) and the presumption of validity and its rationale and applicability to claims that issued through original prosecution and traditional inquisitorial reexamination proceedings. In Part II, we examine how previously issued claims and amended claims presented in motions to amend in post issuance proceedings before the PTAB after Aqua Products are addressed and the procedures and duties of the relative participants with respect to testing each such claim. In Part III, we analyze the proper role of the presumption of validity for claims that issue in post issuance proceedings, both previously issued claims and amended claims.<br /><br />The full White Paper is <a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/-/media/pqi/files/articles/pqi---presumption-of-validity-article.pdf" target="_blank">Available Here</a>. Fri, 28 Sep 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/article09282018/ NYSBA - Bright Ideas:<br>Is the Presumption of Validity Dead for Substitute Claims Issued as a Result of Motions to Amend After PTAB Proceedings? http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/winterarticle2018/ In a related White Paper published by Askeladden LLC&rsquo;s Patent Quality Initiative, we analyze the proper role of a the presumption of validity for claims that have been amended in post-issuance proceedings like Inter Partes Review (IPR) proceedings under the Smith-Leahy American Invents Act (AIA). A full copy of our paper is available <a href="http://www.patentqualityinitiative.com/-/media/pqi/files/articles/pqi---presumption-of-validity-article.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. The following is taken from an excerpt published in the Winter 2018 edition of NYSBA Bright Ideas Vol. 27 No. 3 discussing the history of the presumption of validity and our conclusion that the presumption of validity should not apply to substitute claims, since such claims have never been fully examined and thus not entitled to the presumption that they were.<br /> <br />Introduction<br /> <br />Under Section 282 of the Patent Act of 1952, a patent &ldquo;shall be presumed valid,&rdquo; and &ldquo;[t]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.&rdquo; As Judge Rich, one of the authors of the 1952 Patent Act, explained, the rationale for this presumption is based on &ldquo;the basic proposition that a government agency such as the [PTO] was presumed to do its job.&rdquo; This presumption makes sense in the context of the statutory scheme of the 1952 Act, which first codified this presumption, where a patent application follows an &ldquo;inquisitorial process between patent owner and examiner.&rdquo; Thus, the examiner, acting on behalf of the government, can be presumed to have performed his or her job if and when patent claims issue.<br /> <br />However, in 2011, under the Leahy-Smith American Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;), unlike the original prosecution, or even traditional ex parte reexamination, &ldquo;the petitioner is master of its complaint and nor&not;mally entitled to judgment on all of the claims it raises, not just those the decisionmaker might wish to address.&rdquo; To the extent all the PTAB is performing is &ldquo;a second look at an earlier administrative grant of a patent,&rdquo; continuing to apply this presumption to claims that survive a PTAB proceeding (like an inter partes review) continues to make sense. After all, the government did its job in the first instance in the original inquisitorial examination, and a third party challenger was unable to demonstrate error.<br /> <br />However, since the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision in Aqua Products, Inc. v. Matal confirmed that the burden of persuasion on the patentability of amended claims in a motion to amend in an inter partes review proceeding (and presumably other post issuance PTAB proceedings) is placed on the petitioner, the theoretical rationale for Section 282(a)&rsquo;s presumption of validity is no longer present for such amended claims. In particular, there is no government agency that is tasked with performing the inquisitorial examination that gave rise to the original presumption. How can there be a presumption that the government agent charged with examining the patent claims did his or her job, when there is no such person assigned to perform that job?<br /> <br />Full article available <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/BrightIdeas-Winter18.pdf" target="_blank">HERE</a>.<br /><br type="_moz" /> Fri, 28 Sep 2018 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/winterarticle2018/