Amster Rothstein & Ebenstein, LLP - Intellectual Property Law http://www.arelaw.com/ Amster, Rothstein & Ebenstein is a well-established mid-sized legal firm engaged exclusively in the practice of intellectual property law, including patents, trademarks, copyrights, unfair competition and related matters. Since our inception in 1953, we have earned an impressive record of successes for our clients, from individuals to multinational corporations, both domestic and worldwide. These successes are borne of the vigorous application of legal expertise, innovation and objective analysis. en Wed, 17 Jul 2019 14:53:46 +0000 Floodlight Design CMS IPWatchdog<br>NYIPLA Urges Supreme Court Not to Award USPTO Staff Attorney Salaries as ‘Expenses’ in Patent Appeals to ED of Virginia http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/07102019article/ On June 25, 2019, the New York Intellectual Property Association (NYIPLA) filed an <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-801/104097/20190625162730763_18-801%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf" target="_blank">Amicus Brief</a> in support of the Respondent in <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/peter-v-nantkwest-inc/" target="_blank">Peter v. NantKwest, Inc.</a>, No. 18-801, pending before the Supreme Court. NantKwest raises the issue of whether patent applicants who are dissatisfied with U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) decisions and subsequently appeal to the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia must pay USPTO staff attorney salaries as part of &ldquo;[a]ll the expenses of the proceedings&rdquo; under 35 U.S.C. Section 145, which allows applicants to pursue a civil action against decisions of the USPTO Director.<br /><br /><a href="https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/07/10/nyipla-urges-supreme-court-not-award-uspto-staff-attorney-salaries-expenses-patent-appeals-ed-virginia/id=111140/" target="_blank">Full Article</a> Wed, 10 Jul 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/07102019article/ ARE Trademark Law Alert:<br>New U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Rule Requires Foreign Trademark Applicants and Registrants to Be Represented by U.S. Attorneys<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert07082019/ A new rule introduced by the U.S. Patent &amp; Trademark Office (&ldquo;USPTO&rdquo;) and taking effect on August 3, 2019 requires foreign trademark applicants and registrants to be represented by licensed U.S. attorneys. <br /><br />After that date, the USPTO will no longer accept trademark applications, renewal applications, statements or declarations of use, or any other trademark filings from individuals and organizations outside the U.S. who are not represented by U.S. attorneys. In other words, foreign trademark owners will not be able to make any trademark-related filings with the USPTO on their own (&ldquo;pro se&rdquo;). This change was made to combat the rapidly increasing number of fraudulent pro se trademark filings made by foreign applicants, which constitutes a significant problem for the USPTO and legitimate trademark owners alike. From now on, foreign owners of trademark rights wishing to seek, secure and maintain trademark protection in the United States should either retain services and work directly with U.S. counsel or have their local trademark counsel retain qualified U.S. attorneys to represent them.<br /><br />Foreign applicants who designate the United States for trademark protection as part of International Registration under the Madrid Protocol are also subject to this requirement. The World Intellectual Property Organization (&ldquo;WIPO&rdquo;) does not presently offer an option in the Madrid Protocol application form to designate U.S. counsel to represent the applicant. Therefore, until such time as WIPO changes its practices and forms to accommodate this new rule, the USPTO will waive the requirement for the small subset of Madrid applications that are submitted with all other U.S. formalities and statutory requirements satisfied, so that they are in condition for acceptance and publication for opposition purposes. For the vast majority (97%) of Madrid Protocol applications designating the United States, however, foreign applicants will be informed in the first Office Action of the requirement to appoint a qualified U.S. attorney to represent them, and such applications will be deemed abandoned if the Office Action is not addressed within the prescribed six-month response period by a U.S. attorney. <br /><br />All official communications that require a response (e.g., Office Actions) that the USPTO issues with respect to pro se U.S. trademark applications, renewals, or maintenance filings pending or due as of August 3, 2019, regardless of their application or registration basis, will include the requirement to retain services of U.S. counsel. <br /><br />To combat fraud, the USPTO has set up internal auditing policies to detect foreign pro se applicants or registrants who would attempt to get around this rule by using temporary or false U.S. addresses, or by alleging that they are represented by U.S. attorneys whom they have not actually engaged. The USPTO may sanction foreign applicants or registrants who seek to circumvent the rule in this manner by deeming their applications to be abandoned or cancelling their registrations.<br /><br />The USPTO anticipates that this rule change will decrease the amount of fraudulent pro se trademark applications filed by foreign applicants, and will increase the overall quality and integrity of registered U.S. trademarks by ensuring that foreign applicants and registrants have the benefit of the expertise of qualified U.S. attorneys subject to the higher standards of professional care as well as rules of professional ethics and USPTO&rsquo;s disciplinary authority. Although this change may increase the cost of obtaining and maintaining U.S. trademarks for parties who previously acted pro se, the USPTO anticipates that this rule should ultimately benefit all legitimate trademark owners as they will enjoy cost savings on prosecution as well as enforcement proceedings involving fraudulent trademark applications or registrations.<br /><br />Please contact us if you have any questions regarding this issue. We will continue to monitor and report on further developments in this area of the law as they occur.<br /><br />*Anthony F. Lo Cicero and Max Vern are partners, and David P. Goldberg is an associate, at the U.S. law firm Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in obtaining and enforcing trademarks rights in the U.S. and around the world. They may be reached at <a href="mailto:alocicero@arelaw.com">alocicero@arelaw.com</a>, <a href="mailto:mvern@arelaw.com">mvern@arelaw.com</a>, and <a href="mailto:dgoldberg@arelaw.com">dgoldberg@arelaw.com</a>. Mon, 08 Jul 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert07082019/ In The Press: <br>New York Foundation for the Arts Names New Board Chair<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress07022019/ New York Foundation for the Arts has appointed Marc Jason, senior counsel at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP, as chair of its board of trustees. Jason has been a member of NYFA&rsquo;s board since 2013, and he specializes in trademark and copyright litigation. He succeeds Judith K. Brodsky, founding director of Brodsky Center for Innovative Editions, as chair.<br /><br />Full article:&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href="http://www.artnews.com/2019/07/01/breaking-art-industry-news-july-1-2019/" target="_blank">www.artnews.com/2019/07/01/breaking-art-industry-news-july-1-2019/</a> Tue, 02 Jul 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress07022019/ In The Press:<br>Law360 turns to partner Charles R. Macedo for his insights on patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. 101 in view of the recent Federal Circuit decision in Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress06282019/ Law360 turns to partner Charles R. Macedo for his insights on patent-eligibility under 35 U.S.C. 101 in view of the recent Federal Circuit decision in Cellspin Soft, Inc. v. Fitbit, Inc.:<br /><br /><div style="margin-left: 40px;">However, since the Federal Circuit had already held that ineligibility must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, &quot;I think that this is really the natural consequence of Berkheimer,&rdquo; said Charles R. Macedo of Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP.<br />&nbsp;</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;">Potentially more impactful is another part of the decision about the type of evidence from patent owners that is sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss on eligibility grounds, which &ldquo;to me is a much bigger holding,&rdquo; he said.<br /> ***</div><div style="margin-left: 40px;">What had been happening up to this point, Macedo said, is that those challenging patents have argued that because the patent owner did not write out in the specification that the invention is unconventional or solves specific problems, it is grounds for the patent to be found ineligible. The Federal Circuit's ruling means that if patentees can prove the invention has benefits, that's enough, regardless of whether they are spelled out in the specification, he said.&nbsp;&nbsp;That is &quot;more appropriate place for the law to be,&quot; he said. &quot;There shouldn't be gamesmanship about draftsmanship. The question should be: Is the invention deserving of protection?&quot;&nbsp;&nbsp;As a result of the decision, if the patent owner can put up a good technical explanation of why the claims are unconventional and do not cover an abstract idea, &ldquo;they now have a wider array of evidence that they can rely upon&quot; beyond the language in the specification, he said.</div><div><br />For the full article, please click <a href="/images/file/Fed_%20Circ_%20Ruling%20May%20Mean%20Higher%20Bar%20For%20Alice%20Motions.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>.</div> Fri, 28 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress06282019/ In The Press:<br>Law360 Reports on NYIPLA Amicus Brief Submitted to SCOTUS By Firm Regarding USPTO's Controversial Policy of Seeking Attorney Fees<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress06262019/ Law360 Reports on NYIPLA Amicus Brief Submitted to SCOTUS By Firm Regarding&nbsp;USPTO's Controversial Policy of Seeking Attorney Fees.<br /><br />(June 26, 2019, Law360) Law 360 Reported on amicus brief filing on behalf of NYIPLA by Partner Charles R. Macedo (as counsel of record and Co-Chair of the NYIPLA PTAB Committee) and Associate David Goldberg (as Co-Chair of the NYIPLA Amicus Briefs Committee) in&nbsp;Peter v. Nantkwest Inc.<br /><br />&ldquo;Allowing the [USPTO]&rsquo;s interpretation &hellip; to stand would penalize parties for merely commencing a lawsuit to such a degree that many parties of limited means simply could not have their statutorily granted day in court,&rdquo; said Charles Macedo of Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP, co-chair of the NYIPLA's PTAB committee.<br /><br />For the full article, please click <a href="/images/file/USPTO's%20'Peculiar'%20Fee%20Rule%20Hurts%20Inventors%20IP%20Attys%20Say.pdf" target="_blank">here</a>. Wed, 26 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/inthepress06262019/ Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Respondent, Peter v. Nantkwest, No. 18-801 (S.Ct. Jun. 26, 2019) http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus06252019/ Click to download PDF:&nbsp; <a href="/images/file/Brief%20of%20Amicus%20Curiae%20New%20York%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association%20in%20Support%20of%20Respondent,%20Peter%20v_%20Nantkwest,%20No_%2018-801%20(S_Ct_%20Jun_%2026,%202019).pdf" target="_blank">Brief of Amicus Curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in Support of Respondent, Peter v. Nantkwest, No. 18-801</a>&nbsp; Tue, 25 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus06252019/ ARE Trademark Law Alert:<br>SUPREME COURT CONFIRMS THAT IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH FOR THE US TRADEMARK OFFICE TO REFUSE REGISTRATION TO IMMORAL OR SCANDALOUS MARKS<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06242019/ (June 24, 2019)&nbsp; In its June 24, 2019 decision in <i>Iancu v. Brunetti</i>, the Supreme Court held that the Lanham Act&rsquo;s Section 2(a) prohibition against the registration of &ldquo;immoral&rdquo; or &ldquo;scandalous&rdquo; trademarks violates the First Amendment.&nbsp; This ruling has been widely expected since the Court&rsquo;s 2017 decision in <i>Matal v. Tam</i>, which held that the Lanham Act&rsquo;s similar bar to the registration of &ldquo;disparaging trademarks&rdquo; violated the First Amendment. &nbsp;Unsurprisingly, the Court drew heavily from the <i>Tam</i> decision for its opinion in this matter.<div>&nbsp;</div> <div>In 2011, Erik Brunetti filed a U.S. trademark application for FUCT, the name of his clothing line. &nbsp;Brunetti&rsquo;s application was rejected by the US Patent &amp; Trademark Office (&ldquo;PTO&rdquo;) as being &ldquo;highly offensive&rdquo; and &ldquo;vulgar,&rdquo; and therefore unregistrable under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act. &nbsp;The Examining Attorney&rsquo;s rejection was affirmed by the PTO&rsquo;s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;TTAB&rdquo;). &nbsp;Even though the brand name is &ldquo;the equivalent of [the] past participle form of a well-known word of profanity&rdquo; (<i>see Brunetti</i>,588 U.S. __ (2019), Tr. of Oral Arg. 5) the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overturned the TTAB&rsquo;s decision, because it found that the Lanham Act&rsquo;s restriction violated the First Amendment.&nbsp; The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision, which it affirmed.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>The Supreme Court&rsquo;s majority opinion<i>, </i>written by Justice Kagan and joined by Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh,noted &ldquo;this Court first considered a First Amendment challenge to a trademark registration restriction in <i>Tam</i>, just two Terms ago.&rdquo; <i>Brunetti</i>,588 U.S. __ (2019) (slip op., at 4). &nbsp;While acknowledging that in <i>Tam, </i>the Court split between two non-majority opinions, all the <i>Tam</i> Justices agreed on two points. First, that trademark registration bars are unconstitutional if they are &ldquo;viewpoint-based,&rdquo; and second, that the bar on &ldquo;disparaging trademarks&rdquo; was viewpoint-based. <i>Id</i>.&nbsp; &ldquo;The Justices thus found common ground in a core postulate of free speech law: The government may not discriminate on speech based on the ideas or opinions it contains.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i></div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>Having established that the &ldquo;viewpoint-based&rdquo; test is settled law for restrictions on trademark applications, &ldquo;the key question becomes: Is the &lsquo;immoral or scandalous&rsquo; criterion in the Lanham Act viewpoint-neutral or viewpoint-based?&rdquo; <i>Id</i>. at 5.&nbsp; The Court overwhelmingly found that the bar on &ldquo;immoral or scandalous&rdquo; trademarks is &ldquo;viewpoint-based,&rdquo; given the dictionary definition of the terms as well as their use in practice. The Court noted that &ldquo;immoral and scandalous&rdquo; terms are those that defy &ldquo;society&rsquo;s sense of decency or propriety&rdquo; and that &ldquo;the statute on its face, distinguishes between &hellip; those [trademarks] aligned with conventional moral standards and those hostile to them; those including societal nods of approval and those provoking offense and condemnation.&rdquo; <i>Id. </i>at 6. &nbsp;The Court also found that, in practice, the PTO&rsquo;s refusal to register trademarks under the &ldquo;immoral or scandalous&rdquo; standard was based on their <i>message </i>and not their <i>content</i>.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>As an example of the kind of improper message-based discrimination under the &ldquo;immoral or scandalous,&rdquo; standard, the Supreme Court found it improper that the PTO denied registrations for the trademarks YOU CAN&rsquo;T SPELL HEALTHCARE WITHOUT THC (for pain relief medicine) and KO KANE (for a beverage), but granted registrations for D.A.R.E. TO RESIST DRUGS AND VIOLENCE or SAY NO TO DRUGS &ndash; REALITY IS THE BEST TRIP IN LIFE. It would be one thing if <i>all </i>trademarks making references to drugs were barred, but the Court thought it improper that, depending on content, only certain drug references were barred.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>In addition to the majority opinion of the Court, four Justices filed separate opinions.&nbsp; Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion in which he agreed with the reasoning of the majority but encouraged Congress to draft &ldquo;a more carefully focused statute that precludes the registration of marks containing vulgar terms.&rdquo; <i>Brunetti</i>,588 U.S. __ (2019) (Alito, J., concurring slip op., at 1).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>Three other Justices, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, filed separate opinions concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part to express their separate reasons for thinking that, while the bar to registering &ldquo;immoral&rdquo; marks is unconstitutional, the bar to registering &ldquo;scandalous&rdquo; marks can be construed narrowly so as not to violate First Amendment free speech rights.&nbsp; For instance, in Justice Sotomayor&rsquo;s view, scandalous &ldquo;can be read broadly (to cover both offensive ideas and offensive manners of expressing ideas), or it can be read narrowly (to cover only offensive modes of expression).&rdquo; <i>Iancu v. Brunetti</i>, 588 U.S. __ (2019) (Sotomayor, J., concurring/dissenting slip op., at 3). &nbsp;Because &ldquo;scandalous&rdquo; can have both a narrow and a broad meaning, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance dictates that the Court should construe it narrowly. Additionally, Justice Sotomayor cited several other canons of construction to argue that &ldquo;scandalous&rdquo; only covers &ldquo;offensive modes of expression,&rdquo; and took the majority to task for collapsing &ldquo;immoral and scandalous&rdquo; into one phrase, rather than two distinct terms. <i>Id</i>. at 6.<i> &nbsp;</i>In Justice Sotomayor&rsquo;s view, the Court should have held the bar on &ldquo;scandalous&rdquo; trademarks to be constitutional under the First Amendment. <i>Id.</i> at 19.</div> <div><i>&nbsp;</i></div> <div>The Supreme Court&rsquo;s holding in this case is expected to have a large impact on trademark law.&nbsp; Indeed, in her separate opinion, Justice Sotomayor predicted a &ldquo;rush&rdquo; to register offensive trademarks following this decision. <i>Id</i>. at 1. &nbsp;However, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that Congress may in the future consider passing a more narrowly tailored law to bar trademarking obscenities and other offensive content that would pass constitutional muster.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>We will continue to monitor the law in this area and publish further alerts as developments occur.&nbsp; In the meantime, please feel free to contact our attorneys if you have any questions regarding this alert.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> *Anthony F. Lo Cicero and Charles R. Macedo are partners, David P. Goldberg is an associate, and Barak Bacharach is a Summer Associate at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues. They may be reached at <a href="mailto:alocicero@arelaw.com">alocicero@arelaw.com</a>, <a href="mailto:cmacedo@arelaw.com">cmacedo@arelaw.com</a>, <a href="mailto:dgoldberg@arelaw.com">dgoldberg@arelaw.com</a>, and <a href="mailto:bbacharach@arelaw.com">bbacharach@arelaw.com</a>.<br /> Mon, 24 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06242019/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS NOT A “PERSON” CAPABLE OF PETITIONING FOR INSTITUTION OF AIA REVIEW PROCEEDINGS<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06102019/ Messrs. Macedo and Goldberg represented amicus curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in this case at the Supreme Court.Messrs. Macedo and Goldberg represented amicus curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in this case at the Supreme Court.S. Supreme Court delivered an opinion in <i>Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service</i>, No. 17-1594, slip op. (U.S. June 10, 2019), addressing the question of whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;).&nbsp; In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the U.S. Government is not a &ldquo;person&rdquo; capable of petitioning for institution of AIA review proceedings. &nbsp;Slip op. at 17-18.<br /><br /><div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">In the proceedings below, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (&ldquo;PTAB&rdquo;) issued a final written decision in a Covered Business Method patent review (&ldquo;CBM&rdquo;) proceeding brought by the U.S. Postal Service (&ldquo;Postal Service&rdquo;) as a petitioner, invalidating certain claims of a patent owned (and asserted in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims) by Return Mail, Inc.&nbsp; USPS is a &ldquo;government entity&rdquo; as recognized in <i>United States Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd.</i>, 540 U.S. 736, 748 (2004). &nbsp;The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (&ldquo;Federal Circuit&rdquo;) affirmed the PTAB&rsquo;s holding that the Postal Service has standing to file a petition to institute a CBM proceeding.&nbsp; The U.S. Supreme Court then granted Return Mail&rsquo;s petition for a writ of certiorari on the question of whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute review proceedings under the AIA.</div> <div>The New York Intellectual Property Law Association (&ldquo;NYIPLA&rdquo;), represented by Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein, LLP and others submitted an amicus brief to the Supreme Court in support of neither party. While the NYIPLA took no position as to the ultimate merits of Petitioner Return Mail&rsquo;s underlying position, i.e., whether the government is a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition to institute a CBM proceeding under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B), the NYIPLA argued that it strongly believes that the Court should carefully consider the potential implications of interpreting &ldquo;person&rdquo; in Title 35 of the U.S. Code (&ldquo;Patent Act&rdquo;) and the AIA as including or excluding the government generally, and then issue only a narrow holding on the scope of &ldquo;person&rdquo; under AIA &sect; 18(a)(1)(B) and, if at all, under 35 U.S.C. &sect;&sect; 311(a) and 321(a). (See Brief for Amicus Curiae NYIPLA in Support of Neither Party, Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service et al., No. 17-1594, (U.S. Dec. 17, 2018) (<a href="https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf" target="_blank">https://www.arelaw.com/images/file/17-1594%20ac%20NY%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association.pdf</a>)).<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">Justice Sotomayor (joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh) wrote the majority opinion of the Court.&nbsp; Justice Sotomayor&rsquo;s opinion notes that the relevant patent statutes do not define the term &ldquo;person,&rdquo; thus weighing in favor of a long-standing presumption against including the sovereign within that term in a way that reflects the term&rsquo;s common usage. &nbsp;Slip op. at 6-7.&nbsp; The opinion points out that courts have used the definition of &ldquo;person&rdquo; that is laid out by the Dictionary Act, unless the context indicates otherwise, and that the definition of &ldquo;person&rdquo; includes many entities but not the federal government.<i>&nbsp; Id. </i>at 7-9.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The majority also addressed the Postal Service&rsquo;s arguments that the context of the AIA itself indicates intent to include the government as a &ldquo;person.&rdquo; &nbsp;The Postal Service argued that the AIA&rsquo;s reference to a &ldquo;person&rdquo; in the context of post-issuance review proceedings must include the government because other references to persons in the patent statutes appear to do so. &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 9-10.&nbsp; While the majority opinion noted that words used by Congress in one part of a statute often have the same meaning elsewhere in the same statute, there are at least 18 references to &ldquo;person&rdquo; throughout the Patent Act with no clear trend shown.&nbsp; Some of the references include the government, others exclude the government, and others could be read either way.&nbsp; <i>Id.</i> at 10.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Postal Service cited to 35 U.S.C. &sect; 207(a)(1), which authorizes federal agencies to obtain patents, as a sufficient contextual clue that &ldquo;person&rdquo; as is referred to within the statute governing the patent application process must include federal agencies. &nbsp;<i>Id. </i>at 10.&nbsp; However, Justice Sotomayor wrote that Section 207 &ldquo;implies nothing about what a federal agency may or may not do following the issuance of someone else&rsquo;s patent.&rdquo; <i>Id.</i> at 11.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Postal Service then pointed to the USPTO&rsquo;s Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP).&nbsp; <i>Id. </i>at 13.&nbsp; Specifically, the MPEP has considered federal agencies to be &ldquo;persons&rdquo; capable of requesting<i> ex parte</i> reexamination at USPTO since 1981. &nbsp;<i>Id.</i>&nbsp; However, the Court&rsquo;s majority held that this has no direct relevance on the case here because an <i>ex parte</i> reexamination, a proceeding handled internally within the USPTO, and AIA validity trials, which are adversarial, adjudicatory proceedings handled between parties, are meaningfully different. <i>Id.</i> at 14-15.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">Finally, the Postal Service argued that it must be a &ldquo;person&rdquo; who may petition for AIA review proceedings because, like other potential infringers, it is subject to civil liability and can assert a defense of patent invalidity. &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 15-16.&nbsp; However, the Court noted that &ldquo;the Postal Service overstates the asymmetry.&rdquo; &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 15.&nbsp; Non-governmental actors might face injunctions, a jury trial, or punitive damages for their infringement while government agencies only have to provide &ldquo;reasonable and entire compensation.&rdquo; &nbsp;<i>Id.</i> at 16.&nbsp; The majority held that &ldquo;[b]ecause federal agencies face lower risks, it is reasonable for Congress to have treated them differently.&rdquo;&nbsp; <i>Id.</i>&nbsp; Furthermore, excluding federal agencies from AIA review avoids the &ldquo;awkward situation&rdquo; that would follow if a civilian patent owner had to face a validity challenge from a federal agency in a proceeding overseen by a different federal agency.&nbsp; <i>Id.</i> at 17.</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">In a separate opinion, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan) dissented the Court&rsquo;s majority opinion.&nbsp; <i>Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service</i>, No. 17-1594, slip op. (U.S. June 10, 2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). &nbsp;The dissent argued that the factors regarding congressional intent on the definition of &ldquo;person&rdquo; weighed against the Court&rsquo;s traditional presumption excluding the sovereign from that definition. &nbsp;Justice Breyer agreed with the Postal Service that Section 207(a)(1)&rsquo;s authorization of federal agencies to obtain patents led to &ldquo;no dispute&rdquo; that the word &ldquo;person&rdquo; in the patent-eligibility provisions must include the government.&nbsp; <i>Id. </i>at 3.</div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"><span style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">We expect that related issues will likely arise soon, and will continue to monitor the PTAB, Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court for the latest developments in the interpretation of the AIA.&nbsp; In the meantime, should you have any questions, please feel free to contact one of our lawyers.</span></div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">&nbsp;</div> <div><span style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">*Charles R. Macedo is a Partner, and&nbsp;</span>David P. Goldberg and Christopher Lisiewski<span style="color: rgb(51, 51, 51); background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;"> are Associates at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. </span>The authors may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, dgoldberg@arelaw.com, and clisiewski@arelaw.com.<br /><span style="font-size:12.0pt;Times New Roman"><br /></span>Messrs. Macedo and Goldberg represented amicus curiae New York Intellectual Property Law Association in this case at the Supreme Court.</div> Mon, 10 Jun 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert06102019/ AR&E TRADEMARK LAW ALERT: SUPREME COURT HOLDS TRADEMARK LICENSE CANNOT BE RESCINDED IN BANKRUPTCY IN MISSION PRODUCT HOLDINGS INC. V. TEMPNOLOGY, LLC http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert05222019/ <span style="text-indent: 0.5in;"><span id="1558625635057S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span><span id="1558625634921S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span><span id="1558625635138S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span><span id="1558625634397S" style="display: none;">&nbsp;</span>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; (May 22, 2019), On May 20, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court strengthened trademark licenses by holding that a bankrupt debtor&rsquo;s right to reject certain contracts under Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code does not permit the debtor to rescind trademark licenses. <em>See Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC</em>, 587 U.S. __ (2019).&nbsp;</span><div style="text-indent:.5in">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-indent:.5in">The Court ruled in favor of trademark licensee Mission Product Holdings Inc., which had a license from clothing designer Tempnology. When Tempnology filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it sought to rescind its license to Mission.&nbsp; Mission objected under Section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, which stated that a &ldquo;licensee of a right to intellectual property&rdquo; could choose to retain its licensed rights, so long as it was not in breach (e.g., paying its Royalty obligations). Tempnology argued that &ldquo;intellectual property&rdquo; was defined in the Bankruptcy Code to include trade secrets, patents, and copyrights, but it did not include &ldquo;trademarks.&rdquo;&nbsp; The Bankruptcy Court ruled with Tempnology, and extinguished the license. <i>In re Tempnology, LLC</i>, 541 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2015).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed the decision relying on the decision in <i>Sunbeam Products, Inc. </i>v. <i>Chicago A. Mfg., LLC</i>, 686 F. 3d 372, 376&ndash;377 (7th Cir. 2012). The Panel focused heavily on the statement in Section 365(g) that rejection of a contract &ldquo;constitutes a breach.&rdquo; Therefore, while a rejection converts a debtor&rsquo;s unfulfilled obligations to a pre-petition damages claim, it does not terminate the contract or extinguish the licensee&rsquo;s rights. <i>Mission Products Holdings, Inc. </i>v. <i>Tempnology, LLC</i>, 589 B.R. 809 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit then rejected the Appellate Panel&rsquo;s view, and reinstated the lower court decision, reasoning that the trademark owner&rsquo;s inability to monitor and exercise quality control over goods associated with the mark jeopardizes the continued validity of its own rights. <i>Mission Products Holdings, Inc. </i>v. <i>Tempnology, LLC</i>, 879 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 2018).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the question of whether a rejection has the same consequences as a contract breach, or if the rejection terminates the entire agreement, effectively rescinding the contract altogether. The Supreme Court took the former view and reversed the First Circuit, agreeing with the Seventh Circuit&rsquo;s rejection-as-breach approach. The decision effectively gives each party distinct options, similar to those in typical breach of contract cases. The debtor-licensor, upon filing for bankruptcy, may choose to continue its contracts or reject its obligations, repudiating any further performance of its duties. The licensee may keep up its side of the agreement, continuing to pay for the use of the trademark while also having the opportunity to seek damages for the breach. The licensee may also choose to walk away from the agreement and sue for the resulting damages. The termination of the trademark license is entirely at the hands of the licensee. <i>Mission Product Holdings, Inc.</i> v. <i>Tempnology, LLC</i>, 587 U.S. __ (2019).&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-indent:.5in">The Court explained that the rejection-as-breach rule ensures that a debtor is subject to its counterparty&rsquo;s contractual rights even after the bankruptcy petition is filed. The rule prevents a debtor in bankruptcy from recapturing interests it had given up through contract. In its rejection of Tempnology&rsquo;s argument that trademarks were specifically left out of Section 365, the Court pointed out that Congress has enacted the provisions in that section when needed to enforce or clarify the general rule that contractual rights survive rejection. For example, following the Fourth Circuit&rsquo;s decision in <i>Lubrizol Enterprises </i>v. <i>Richmond Metal Finishers</i>, 756 F. 2d 1043 (1985)to adopt the same rule for patent licenses that the First Circuit erroneously applied in this case, Congress sprang into action to enact Section 365(n). This section reversed <i>Lubrizol</i> and ensured the continuation of patent licensees&rsquo; rights.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Ultimately, the Court declined to distinguish trademarks from other types of intellectual property licenses covered under Section 365. &nbsp;The implications for trademark law are significant.&nbsp; Parties contemplating reliance on a licensed mark for building a business will now have more comfort that their rights will not be pulled by an unexpected bankruptcy by the licensor.&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; However the Court left certain important questions unanswered though, which may be presented in future cases.&nbsp; For example, if the bankrupt licensor no longer provides actual control over the nature and the quality of the use by the licensee, the Court did not address whether the result may invalidate the trademark under the rules against &ldquo;naked licensing.&rdquo;&nbsp; Future trademark licenses should include detailed provisions attempting to address issues such as this.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; We will continue to follow developments in the law of trademark licensing as it applies to bankruptcy. In the meantime, should you have any questions, please feel free to contact one of our lawyers.</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> * Mr. Rothstein is a partner and Mr. Garrity is a Law Clerk at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. They be reached at crothstein@arelaw.com and dgarrity@arelaw.com.<br /> Wed, 22 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert05222019/ Brief of Amicus Curiae NYIPLA in Support of Petitioner http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus05162019/ <a href="https://www.nyipla.org/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&amp;ID=27902" target="_blank">NYIPLA Urges Supreme Court to Clarify the Definition of &ldquo;Expenses&rdquo; in Lanham Act</a>.<br /><br />On Thursday, May 16, 2019, the New York Intellectual Property Law Association (&ldquo;NYIPLA&rdquo;) filed an amicus brief in support of a petition for a writ of certiorari by Booking.com B.V. urging the Supreme Court to decide whether a trademark applicant must pay the United States Patent and Trademark Office&rsquo;s (&ldquo;PTO&rdquo;) attorneys&rsquo; fees as &ldquo;expenses in United States district court appeals pursuant to 15 U.S.C. &sect; 1071 (b)(3). The NYIPLA takes the position that the Supreme Court should grant certiorari in this case and consolidate it with Peter v. Nantkwest, No. 18-801 under Rules of the Supreme Court 27. <br /> <br />In support, the NYIPLA argued that Booking.com raises the same issue as NantKwest, but challenges the statutory definition of &ldquo;expenses&rdquo; for the Trademark Act (15 U.S.C.) instead of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C.) [&hellip;]<br /><br />Click to download pdf:&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/18-1309%20Motion%20For%20Leave%20To%20File%20Amicus%20Curiae%20Brief%20and%20Brief%20of%20New%20York%20Intellectual%20Property%20Law%20Association%20As%20Amicus%20Curiae%20In%20Support%20of%20Petitioner.pdf" target="_blank">Motion For Leave To File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of New York Intellectual Property Law Association As Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioner</a><br type="_moz" /> Thu, 16 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/amicus05162019/ Practical Law:<br>Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw05142019/ <strong>REVISED&nbsp; May 14, 2019 --&nbsp;<a href="/images/file/20190514%20Understanding%20PTAB%20Trials%20Key%20Milestones%20in%20IPR%20PGR%20and%20CBM%20Proceeding.pdf" target="_blank">Understanding PTAB Trials: Key Milestones in IPR, PGR, and CBM Proceedings</a></strong> Tue, 14 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw05142019/ Iancu v. NantKwest, Inc.<br>USPTO Expenses And Attorneys’ Fees Under Section 145<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/05022019presentation/ <a href="/images/file/2019%20JPPCLE%20-%20Presentation.pdf" target="_blank">USPTO Expenses And Attorneys&rsquo; Fees Under Section 145</a> Thu, 02 May 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/05022019presentation/ Nasdaq Opening Bell – Cornell Blockchain Event http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04112019/ Congratulations to Cornell Blockchain on ringing the bell on April 11, 2019 at NASDAQ. Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP is proud to be a sponsor of the Cornell Blockchain Conference.<br /><br />For more information please see&nbsp;<a href="https://business.nasdaq.com/discover/market-bell-ceremonies/detail.html#!/!?ceremonyId=8574" target="_blank">business.nasdaq.com/discover/market-bell-ceremonies/detail.html#!/!<br /><br /><img src="/images/image/CRM-Nasdaq.jpeg" width="300" height="568" alt="" /><br type="_moz" /></a> Thu, 11 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04112019/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>Federal Circuit Finds Method of Treatment Claims Patent-Eligible, Not Directed to Natural Law<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04012019/ On March 28, 2019, the Federal Circuit issued a unanimous 3-0 decision finding claims covering a method of treatment&mdash;namely, treating pain in renally impaired patients using the opioid oxymorphone&mdash;to be patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 101.&nbsp; This decision in <i>Endo Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.</i>, No. 17-1240 overturned the district court&rsquo;s holding that the claims were merely directed to the natural law that the effective dose of oxymorphone is lower in patients with renal impairment because the bioavailability of oxymorphone is increased in such patients.<div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit rejected the district court&rsquo;s conclusion at step one of the two-part <i>Alice</i>/<i>Mayo </i>test, finding that the claims were not &ldquo;directed to&rdquo; a natural law, but to &ldquo;a method of using oxymorphone . . . to treat pain in a renally impaired patient.&rdquo;&nbsp; The Federal Circuit came to this conclusion based on the specification and the claim language of the following &ldquo;representative&rdquo; claim:</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">1. A method of treating pain in a renally impaired patient, comprising the steps of: </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">a. providing a solid oral controlled release dosage form, comprising: </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">i. about 5 mg to about 80 mg of oxymorphone or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof as the sole active ingredient; and </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">ii. a controlled release matrix;</span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">b. measuring a creatinine clearance rate of the patient and determining it to be </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(a) less than about 30 ml/min, </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(b) about 30 mL/min to about 50 mL/min, </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(c) about 51 mL/min to about 80 mL/min, or </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.75in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">(d) above about 80 mL/min; and </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:6.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">c. orally administering to said patient, in dependence on which creatinine clearance rate is found, a lower dosage of the dosage form to provide pain relief; </span></div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">wherein after said administration to said patient, the average AUC of oxymorphone over a 12-hour period is less than about 21 ng&middot;hr/mL.</span></div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit compared this claim to the claims it found patent-eligible last year in <i>Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. West-Ward Pharmaceuticals International Ltd</i>, 887 F.3d 1117 (Fed. Cir. 2018).&nbsp; Our previous report on the <i>Vanda </i>decision can be found <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert042018/" target="_blank"><span style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">here</span></a>.&nbsp; The Federal Circuit found the <i>Endo</i> claim here &ldquo;legally indistinguishable from the representative claim in <i>Vanda</i>&rdquo; since &ldquo;[b]oth claims recite a method for treating a patient&rdquo; using a dosage regimen based on patient testing.&nbsp; Accordingly, the Federal Circuit repeated its finding from <i>Vanda </i>and found that both claims &ldquo;are directed to a specific method of treatment for specific patients using a specific compound at specific doses to achieve a specific outcome.&rdquo;&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit also distinguished the <i>Endo </i>claims from those found patent-ineligible in <i>Mayo </i>for the same reasons as those stated in <i>Vanda</i>.&nbsp; For example, the Court found that the <i>Endo </i>claims &ldquo;recite the steps of carrying out a dosage regimen based on the results of kidney function testing&rdquo; in contrast to the non-specific claims in <i>Mayo </i>whose testing steps &ldquo;&lsquo;indicat[ed]&rsquo; a need to increase or decrease dosage, without prescribing a specific dosage regimen or other added steps to take as a result of that indication.&rdquo;</div> <div style="margin-bottom:12.0pt">The Federal Circuit&rsquo;s <i>Vanda </i>decision is currently the subject of a pending cert petition, in which the &ldquo;Question Presented&rdquo; by the Petitioners is &ldquo;whether patents that claim a method of medically treating a patient automatically satisfy Section 101 of the Patent Act, even if they apply a natural law using only routine and conventional steps.&rdquo;&nbsp; On March 15, 2019, the Petitioners brought the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision in <i>Natural Alternatives Int'l, Inc. v. Creative Compounds, LLC</i>, No. 18-1295 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019) to the attention of the Supreme Court, since it similarly found method of treatment claims to be patent-eligible.&nbsp; (Both <i>Vanda </i>and <i>Natural Alternatives </i>were split 2-1 decisions of the Federal Circuit.)&nbsp; On March 18, 2019, the Solicitor General was invited to file briefs with regard to the <i>Vanda</i> petition.</div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">We will continue to follow developments in the above cases and the law of patent-eligibility. In the meantime, should you have any questions, please feel free to contact one of our lawyers.<br /><br />*<a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a>, M.S. is a Partner, <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/amiller/" target="_blank">Alan D. Miller, Ph.D.</a> is a Senior Counsel, and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/bamos/" target="_blank">Brian Amos, Ph.D.</a> and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/shudak/" target="_blank">Sandra A. Hudak</a> are Associates at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues, including litigating patent, trademark and other intellectual property disputes. The authors may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, amiller@arelaw.com, bamos@arelaw.com, and shudak@arelaw.com.</div><p>&nbsp;</p> Mon, 01 Apr 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert04012019/ ARE Copyright Law Alert:<br>Supreme Court Resolves Two Circuit Splits Impacting Copyright Litigation in Fourth Estate v. WallStreet.Com and Rimini v. Oracle<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert03062019/ (March 6, 2019). On March 4, 2019, the United States Supreme Court issued two decisions which resolved circuit court splits impacting when copyright infringement cases may be brought and what costs may be recovered when completed.<br /><br />In <em>Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp v. WallStreet.Com, LLC</em> (No. 15-571), the Court held that a claimant cannot file suit for copyright infringement prior to the Copyright Office <u>acting</u> <u>on</u> the application to register. In other words, merely filing an application before commencing a copyright infringement suit is not enough. Rather, the Copyright Office must either issue the Registration or reject the application before a copyright infringement lawsuit may be brought in court. <em>Fourth Estate</em> repudiated the expansive approach that had been adopted by the Ninth Circuit, which permitted a copyright infringement lawsuit to proceed immediately after a copyright application had been filed &mdash; even if it had not been acted upon by the Copyright office. The <em>Fourth Estate</em> decision will have clear implications on the timing and commencement of copyright infringement suits. The losing side had argued unfairness to artists and authors. With respect to resulting damages, the court noted that upon registration a copyright owner can recover for infringement that occurred both before and after the registration. In addition, the copyright owner may still seek an injunction to prevent continued infringement. The copyright office offers expedited procedures for a fee which allows for quicker registration as a mechanism to offset some of the harsher consequences of the <em>Fourth Estate</em> decision.<br /><br />In <em>Rimini Street Inc. et al. v. Oracle USA Inc.</em> (No. 17-1625), the Court addressed the issue of what constitutes &ldquo;full costs&rdquo; under the Copyright Act. Section 505 of the Act states that courts may issue a discretionary award of &ldquo;full costs&rdquo; to any party. The Court concluded that &quot;full costs&quot; do <u>not</u> include major litigation costs such as those for e-discovery vendors and experts, thereby eliminating the Ninth Circuit&rsquo;s more expansive interpretation of the term. This narrow interpretation could affect the calculus of litigants as to whether or not to take a copyright case to trial when an award of costs is a significant portion of the likely ultimate recovery, with some arguing that the conclusion will place an undue burden on individuals and smaller companies with limited resources.<br /><br />To learn more how these decisions may impact your copyrighted work, please feel free to contact the authors.<br /><br />Charles R. Macedo, Chester Rothstein and Doug Miro are partners and Marc Jason is a senior counsel at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. They can be reached at <a href="mailto:cmacedo@arelaw.com">cmacedo@arelaw.com</a>, <a href="mailto:crothstein@arelaw.com">crothstein@arelaw.com</a>, <a href="mailto:dmiro@arelaw.com">dmiro@arelaw.com</a> and <a href="mailto:mjason@arelaw.com">mjason@arelaw.com</a>, respectively. Wed, 06 Mar 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert03062019/ ARE PTO & PTAB Alert:<br>PTO Updates Guidelines Concerning Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02152019/ <span style="text-align: justify;">(February 15, 2019)&nbsp; On January 7, 2019, the USPTO issued its latest guidance on Computer Implemented Functional Claim Limitations. &nbsp;2019 Examining Computer-Implemented Functional Claim Limitations for Compliance With 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112, USPTO, 84 Fed. Reg. 57 (Jan. 7, 2019),</span><i style="text-align: justify;"> available at</i><span style="text-align: justify;">, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28283.pdf (&ldquo;the 2019 Guidelines&rdquo;). &nbsp;The 2019 Guidelines, which do not fundamentally change the current framework for analyzing means-plus-function claims, are meant to &ldquo;assist [USPTO] personnel in the examination of claims in patent applications where functional language is used to claim computer-implemented inventions.&rdquo;&nbsp;</span><div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">The 2019 Guidelines have two parts.&nbsp; The first part &ldquo;addresses issues related to the examination of computer-implemented functional claims having means-plus-function limitations&rdquo; (issues related to means (or step) plus function limitations under 35 U.S.C. 112(f) and definiteness under 35 U.S.C. 112(b)).&nbsp; The second part &ldquo;addresses written description and enablement issues related to the examination of computer-implemented functional claims that recite only the idea of a solution or outcome of a problem, but fail to recite details of how the solution or outcome is accomplished&rdquo; (issues related to proper written description and enablement support under 35 U.S.C. 112(a)).</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div align="center" style="margin-bottom:6.0pt;text-align:center"><b><u>Part I</u></b></div> <div style="text-align:justify">The first part of the 2019 Guidelines requires Examiners to determine whether to apply 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) by first determining the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claim consistent with the specification and one of ordinary skill in the art.&nbsp; Examiners are then asked to implement the following three-pronged test:</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-left:.75in;&#10;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;"><div>1.<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>Determine whether the claim uses the term &ldquo;means&rdquo; or &ldquo;step&rdquo; or another generic placeholder;</div><div>2.<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>Determine whether the claim term is modified by functional language; and</div><div>3.<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>Determine whether the claim term is modified by sufficient disclosure, material, or acts for performing the function</div></div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">Any of the prongs and/or required structure analysis can cause an examiner to apply an analysis under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) (e.g., if a claim uses the term &ldquo;means,&rdquo; the examiner may employ an analysis under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f); if the specification provides a description sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term or phrase denotes structure, then the examiner may determine an analysis under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) is unnecessary).&nbsp; With respect to the third prong, to determine whether a claim term or phrase coupled with a function denotes a structure, examiners are required to analyze whether:</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="margin-left:1.0in;&#10;text-align:justify;text-indent:-.25in;"><div>(a)<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>the specification provides a description sufficient to inform one of ordinary skill in the art that the term or phrase denotes structure;&nbsp;</div><div>(b)<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>general and/or subject matter dictionaries provide evidence that the term or phrase is recognized as a noun denoting structure; and&nbsp;</div><div>(c)<span style="white-space:pre"> </span>the prior art evidences that the term or phrase is recognized in the art as a structure to perform the claimed function.</div></div> <div style="margin-left:1.0in;&#10;text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">If the examiner determines that the claim at issue is to be analyzed under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f), the new guidelines require this be expressly stated in the Office Action.&nbsp; In response to the Office Action which states the claims are being analyzed under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f), the applicant, if he or she wishes to argue that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f) should not be used, must either present a sufficient showing to establish that the claim limitation recites sufficient structure, or amend the claim limitation.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">With regard to computer functions analyzed under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f), the guidelines require the specification to disclose an algorithm for performing the claimed function.&nbsp; Failure to do so will result in an indefiniteness rejection under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(b).&nbsp; An algorithm is defined as a &ldquo;finite sequence of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task.&rdquo;&nbsp; The new guidelines require the algorithm to be sufficient to perform the entire claimed function. &nbsp;Mathematical formulas,&nbsp; prose, a flow chart, or any understandable terms may be employed to satisfy the new algorithm requirement.&nbsp;</div> <div>&nbsp;</div> <div align="center" style="margin-bottom:6.0pt;text-align:center"><b><u>Part II</u></b></div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">The 2019 Guidelines emphasize that 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(a) requires a disclosure to satisfy both the written description requirement and the enablement requirement, regardless of whether an Examiner reviews the claim term or phrase under 35 U.S.C. &sect; 112(f).</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">With respect to the written description requirement, Examiners are to determine whether the scope of enablement is commensurate with the scope of protection sought by the claims.&nbsp; Thus, when examining computer-implemented, software-related claims, the 2019 Guidelines make it clear that Examiners &ldquo;should determine whether the specification discloses the computer and the algorithm(s) that achieve the claimed function in sufficient detail that one of ordinary skill in the art can reasonably conclude that the inventor possessed the claimed subject matter at the time of filing.&rdquo;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">With respect to the enablement requirement, the new guidelines state that Examiners &ldquo;should consider (1) how broad the claim is with respect to the disclosure and (2) whether one skilled in the art could make and use the entire scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.&rdquo;&nbsp; It is important to note here that the new guidelines also make it clear that &ldquo;the high level of skill in the art and the similarly high level of predictability in generating programs to achieve an intended result without undue experimentation&rdquo; may obviate the need to disclose aspects of an invention that are not considered novel (i.e., aspects that are generally well known in the art) in order to meet the enablement requirement.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">The USPTO is accepting written comments from the public regarding the 35 U.S.C. &sect;112(f)&nbsp;guidelines until March 8, 2019.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> <div style="text-align:justify">For more information on patent office practice, please feel free to contact one of our attorneys.</div> <div style="text-align:justify">&nbsp;</div> * Charles R. Macedo Benjamin M. Halpern are partners, and Keith Barkaus and Michael Jones are associates at Amster Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice specializes in intellectual property issues. They may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, bhalpern@arelaw.com,kbarkaus@arelaw.com, and mjones@arelaw.com.<br /> Fri, 15 Feb 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02152019/ ARE PTO & PTAB Alert:<br>PTO Updates Guidelines Concerning Subject Matter Eligibility<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02082019/ February 8, 2019)&nbsp;On January 7, 2019, the USPTO issued its latest guidance on patent-eligibility.&nbsp;2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, USPTO, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019), <i>available at</i>, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf (&ldquo;the 2019 Guidance&rdquo;).&nbsp;The 2019 Guidance explains that the USPTO is revising its examination procedure with respect to step one of the Alice test (referred to as Step 2A in USPTO guidance) to address public concerns and requests for &ldquo;increase[d] clarity and consistency in how Section 101 is currently applied.&rdquo;<div>&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The 2019 Guidance says that it is revising the prior USPTO guidance by &ldquo;(1) Providing groupings of subject matter that is considered an abstract idea; and (2) clarifying that a claim is not &lsquo;&lsquo;directed to&rsquo;&rsquo; a judicial exception if the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception.&quot;<sup>1</sup></div> <div style="line-height:normal"><br />&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; With respect to the first change made by the 2019 Guidance, the USPTO explains that it is making the change because the previous practice of &ldquo;compar[ing] claims at issue to those claims already found to be directed to an abstract idea in previous cases&rdquo; &ldquo;has since become impractical&rdquo; in view of the &ldquo;growing body of precedent&rdquo; on patent-eligibility at the Federal Circuit.&nbsp;The 2019 Guidance thus identifies the following enumerated groupings of abstract ideas, to be used in analyzing patent-eligibility at step one of the <i>Alice </i>test:</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal"><br />(a) <b>Mathematical concepts</b>&mdash;mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical calculations;</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">(b) <b>Certain methods of organizing human activity</b>&mdash;fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions); and</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">(c) <b>Mental processes</b>&mdash;concepts performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; Under the 2019 Guidance, these groupings define the full scope of abstract ideas at step one, except for in &ldquo;the rare circumstance in which a USPTO employee believes a claim limitation that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea.&rdquo;&nbsp;In that &ldquo;rare circumstance,&rdquo; the Technology Center Director must approve any rejection and &ldquo;must provide a justification for why such claim limitation is being treated as reciting an abstract idea.&rdquo;<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; With respect to the second change made by the 2019 Guidance, the <i>Alice </i>step one test is now broken into two prongs under USPTO examination guidance.&nbsp;Examiners will first determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea by<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; (a) &ldquo;[i]dentify[ing] the specific limitation(s) in the claim under examination (individually or in combination) that the examiner believes recites an abstract idea; and</div> <div style="line-height:normal"><span style="white-space:pre"> <br /></span>&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas&rdquo; listed above.<br /><br />&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; In the second prong of <i>Alice </i>step one (i.e., Step 2A), &ldquo;examiners should evaluate whether the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into a practical application of the exception.&rdquo; The 2019 Guidance explains:</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal"><br />A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a <b><i>meaningful limit on the judicial exception</i></b>, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">. . . Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (a) Identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application, using one or more of the considerations laid out by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit . . . .</div> <div style="margin-top:0in;margin-right:.5in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;&#10;margin-left:.5in;text-indent:0in;line-height:normal">[R]evised Step 2A specifically excludes consideration of whether the additional elements represent well-understood, routine, conventional activity. Instead, analysis of well-understood, routine, conventional activity is done in Step 2B. Accordingly, in revised Step 2A <b><i>examiners should ensure that they give weight to all additional elements, whether or not they are conventional, when evaluating whether a judicial exception has been integrated into a practical application</i></b>.</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The 2019 Guidance provides a non-exclusive list of examples of additional elements that may have integrated the exception into a practical application.&nbsp;The 2019 Guidance emphasizes that &ldquo;examiners consider the claim as a whole when evaluating whether the judicial exception is meaningfully limited by integration into a practical application of the exception.&rdquo;<br />&nbsp;<br />&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; The 2019 Guidance then reiterates that examiners must consider the additional elements of the claim again in <i>Alice </i>step two to see whether an additional element or combination of elements &ldquo;[a]dds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field&rdquo; such that the claim includes an inventive concept sufficient for patent-eligibility.<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="line-height:normal">&nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; &nbsp; This 2019 Guidance, which applies the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s most recent decisions (<i>Finjan</i>, <i>Core Wireless</i>, <i>Data Engine</i>, and <i>Ancora</i>) focusing on how patent-eligibility can be found at <i>Alice </i>step one, provides further support that specific methods directed to making technical improvements to solve technical problems are patent-eligible under &sect; 101.<br />&nbsp;</div> <div><div>The authors may be reached at cmacedo@arelaw.com, shudak@arelaw.com. and mjones@arelaw.com.</div> <hr align="left" size="1" width="33%" /> <div id="ftn1"><div style="text-align:justify"><span style="font-size: x-small;">[1] Despite these changes that supersede the USPTO&rsquo;s prior guidance, the 2019 Guidance makes clear that &ldquo;any claim considered patent eligible under prior guidance should be considered patent eligible under this guidance.&rdquo;</span></div></div></div> Fri, 08 Feb 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert02082019/ ARE Patent Law Alert:<br>SUPREME COURT HOLDS CONFIDENTIAL SALES ARE PRIOR ART UNDER THE AIA<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert01222019/ On January 22, 2018, in a unanimous opinion penned by Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s decision holding that a commercial sale to a third party who is required to keep the invention confidential may place the invention &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; under 35 USC &sect;102(a) and that the meaning of the phrase &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; did not change with the implementation of the America Invents Act (&ldquo;AIA&rdquo;). Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc., 586 U.S. ____ (2019)<br /><div><i>&nbsp;</i></div> <div><em>Background</em></div> <div><i>&nbsp;</i></div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">Helsinn Healthcare S.A. (&ldquo;Helsinn&rdquo;) had entered into two agreements with another company granting that company rights to sell a 0.25 mg dose of the chemical palonosetron. The agreement required that the company keep any proprietary information received from Helsinn confidential. Almost two years later, Helsinn filed a provisional patent application directed a 0.25 mg dose of palonosetron. A series of patent applications were filed off of this provisional patent application, including a fourth patent application, filed in 2013 (and thus post-AIA), that issued as U.S. Patent No. 8,598,219 (&ldquo;the &lsquo;219 Patent&rdquo;). The &lsquo;219 Patent claims a dose of 0.25 mg of palonosetron in a 5 ml solution. <br /><br />Helsinn sued Teva Pharmaceutical Industries, Ltd., and Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. (collectively &ldquo;Teva&rdquo;) for infringing its patents, including the &lsquo;219 Patent. Teva argued that the &lsquo;219 Patent was invalid under 35 USC &sect;102(a), precluding a person from obtaining a patent on an invention that was &ldquo;in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention&rdquo;. Teva prevailed at the District Court level, with the Court holding that the AIA&rsquo;s &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; provision did not apply because the public disclosure of the agreements did not disclose the 0.25 mg dose. <br /><br /><em>The Federal Circuit Decision</em><br /><br />In reversing the District Court&rsquo;s decision, the Federal Circuit held that the on-sale bar can be triggered even when the buyer is required to keep the invention confidential. Specifically, the court held, &ldquo;after the AIA, if the existence of the sale is public, the details of the invention need not be publicly disclosed in terms of sale&rdquo; for the sale to be invalidating. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017).<br /><br /><em>The Supreme Court Decision</em><br /><br />In an unanimous decision (authored by Justice Thomas), the Court concluded that the pre-AIA precedent on the meaning of &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; applied equally to the post-AIA law. Noting that the language in USC &sect;102(a) was kept the same, with the exception of the phrase &ldquo;otherwise available to the public&rdquo;, the Court reasoned that the intention of Congress was to keep the settled meaning of the term &ldquo;on sale&rdquo;. The Court declined to read in any additional meaning to &ldquo;on sale&rdquo; from the new phrase, concluding that it was meant only as a catchall and not as modifier to the language (including the term &ldquo;on sale&rdquo;) prior to it.<br /><br />For more information please contact one of our attorneys.<br />&nbsp;</div> <div style="background-image: initial; background-position: initial; background-size: initial; background-repeat: initial; background-attachment: initial; background-origin: initial; background-clip: initial;">&nbsp;</div> * <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/cmacedo/" target="_blank">Charles R. Macedo</a> is a Partner and <a href="https://www.arelaw.com/professional/mhausig/" target="_blank">Matthieu Hausig</a> is a Senior Counsel at Amster, Rothstein &amp; Ebenstein LLP. Their practice focuses on all areas of intellectual property law, including patent, trademark and copyright. They may be contacted at cmacedo@arelaw.com and mhausig@arelaw.com.<br /> Tue, 22 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/alert01222019/ Practical Law<br>IP Rights Clauses in Robotic Process Automation (RPA) Agreements<br> http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw011719/ <a href="/images/file/IP%20Rights%20Clauses%20in%20Robotic%20Process%20Automation%20(RPA)%20Agreements%20(1_17_19).pdf" target="_blank">IP Rights Clauses in Robotic Process Automation (RPA) Agreements</a> Thu, 17 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/practicallaw011719/ Time For High Court To Clarify Standing For IPR Appeals http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/011619article/ In JTEKT Corp. v. GKN Automotive Ltd.,[1] the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit added to a series of decisions, where the Federal Circuit engrafted a patent-inflicted-injury-in-fact requirement for a dissatisfied petitioner in an inter partes review proceeding to appeal an adverse final written decision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board. JTEKT has filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking to have the U.S. Supreme<br />Court review the Federal Circuit&rsquo;s standing jurisprudence. In RPX Corp. v. ChanBond LLC,[2] the Supreme Court invited the solicitor general to provide its views on this very important issue. This article explains why the Supreme Court should confirm a &ldquo;dissatisfied&rdquo; petitioner&rsquo;s right to challenge on appeal an adverse final written decision of the PTAB in an IPR proceeding, as set forth by Congress in 35 U.S.C. &sect; 319.<br /><br /><strong>The Federal Circuit Applies Too Narrow an Injury-in-Fact Test </strong><br /><br />JTEKT is the latest in &ldquo;a series of decisions, [where the Federal Circuit] ha[s] held the statue [35 U.S.C. &sect;141(c)] cannot be read to dispense with the Article III injury-in-fact requirement for appeal to [that] court.&rdquo;[3] <br /><br />As examples of these decisions, JTEKT cited Phigenix Inc. v. Immunogen Inc.,[4] and Consumer Watchdog v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation.[5] Phigenix required the petitioner/appellant to be &ldquo;at risk &lsquo;of infringing the [patent at issue] ... or [other] action that would implicate the patent.&rdquo;[6] Consumer Watchdog involved an inter partes re-examination by a nonprofit organization which did not conduct research and was not a competitor of the patent owner.[7] <br /><br /><a href="https://www.law360.com/articles/1118999/time-for-high-court-to-clarify-standing-for-ipr-appeals" target="_blank">Full article available here</a>. (subscription required)<br type="_moz"><br /><br /><br type="_moz" /></br> Wed, 16 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000 http://www.arelaw.com/publications/view/011619article/